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PROPERTY LAW
Charles H. Rothenberg*
Gloria L. Freye**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article reviews selected judicial decisions and legislation af-
fecting property law in Virginia during the past year. Part I of this
article examines decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia and
the United States District Court for the Western District of Vir-
ginia. Also included are several decisions from the United States
Bankruptcy Courts for the Eastern and Western Districts of Vir-
ginia that examine the relationship between lenders and owners of
commercial properties producing rental income.
Part II of this article reviews legislation affecting property law
passed by the fairly active Virginia General Assembly of 1991. In
particular, it will focus on amendments to the Virginia Property
Owners' Association Act, the Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act, various sections of the Code of Virginia ("Code") that
regulate zoning, and the disposition of unclaimed personal prop-
erty. Reference is also made to the adoption of Article 2A of the
Commercial Code on the leasing of goods.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. Abandonment
The question presented to the Supreme Court of Virginia in
Tidewater Area Charities v. Harbour Gate Owners Association.1
was whether the land underlying an abandoned street was a sepa-
rate parcel, requiring a separate conveyance by the owner of an
Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.A., 1984,
State University of New York, College at Oneonta; J.D., 1987, The T.C. Williams School of
Law, University of Richmond.
** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, Richmond, Virginia; B.S.,
1972, Madison College; M.Ed., 1978, James Madison University; J.D., 1988, The T.C. Wil-
liams School of Law, University of Richmond. The author gratefully acknowledges the assis-
tance of Michael H. Terry, Shareholder, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen.
1. 240 Va. 221, 224, 396 S.E.2d 661, 663 (1990). Lot 17 was located south of Beach Street,
a fifty foot wide street running along the Chesapeake Bay's high water mark. Id.
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abutting lot ("Lot 17"), or was it attached to the abutting lot. The
parties agreed that the entire width of the street and the beach
area to the north of the street, which was widened by accretion
both vested in the abutting lot owner upon the local government's
abandonment of the street.2 A dispute developed when the original
owners of Lot 17 conveyed the land underlying the abandoned
street and its accretions as a separate parcel to Tidewater eight
years after conveying Lot 17 to Harbour Gate's predecessor in ti-
tle.3 Tidewater sought to eject Harbour Gate from the abandoned
street and its accretions. 4
The court stated that "a conveyance of land which is bounded
by an abandoned road carries with it all the grantor's interest in
the former road, unless a contrary intention is expressly set forth
in the deed." 5 The deeds conveying Lot 17 contained no reserva-
tion of the land underlying the abandoned street or its accretions.
Therefore, the deeds conveyed all of the original owners' interest
in the abandoned street and the accretions to Harbour Gate's
predecessor in title. Accordingly, the original owner no longer had
a property right in the road to convey to Tidewater.
B. Adverse Possession
In Grappo v. Blanks,7 Grappo sought to defend against Blanks'
ejectment action by establishing title to a 3.68-acre tract of land
through adverse possession, and by showing that Blanks was not
2. 240 Va. at 225, 396 S.E.2d at 663. The court noted that § 15-967.18 of the Code, in
effect at the time of the 1962 abandonment, survived as § 15.1-483 of the Code. Id. Section
15.1-483 of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that an abandonment operates to:
vest fee simple title to the centerline of any streets, alleys or easements for public
passage so vacated in the owners of abutting lots free and clear of any rights of the
public or other owners of lots shown on the plat. . . . If any such street, alley or
easement for public passage is located on the periphery of the plat, such title for the
entire width thereof shall vest in such abutting lot owners.
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-483 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
3. Tidewater Area Charities, 240 Va. at 225, 396 S.E.2d at 664. The owners of Lot 17 at
the time of the abandonment subsequently conveyed it to a Mr. Brown and made no men-
tion of the abandoned street in the deed. In 1973, Brown conveyed Lot 17 to Harbour Gate,
which built a high rise condominium on the waterfront property. A 1973 survey showed that
the beach had widened 180 feet north of the north line of the abandoned street. Id. at 225,
396 S.E.2d at 663-64.
4. Id. at 226, 396 S.E.2d at 664.
5. Id. at 227, 396 S.E.2d at 665 (citing Williams v. Miller, 184 Va. 274, 35 S.E.2d 127
(1954)).
6. Id. at 228, 396 S.E.2d at 665.
7. 241 Va. 58, 59, 400 S.E.2d 168, 169 (1991).
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the record owner of the property. The disputed 3.68-acre tract was
originally part of thirty-two acres owned by Kibler. In 1942, Kibler
conveyed the 3.68-acre tract to Strickler, who later conveyed it to
Blanks. The remaining twenty-nine acres were conveyed to Mene-
fee in 1948. In 1959, Menefee erected a fence around the bounda-
ries of his 118 acres of land as well as Blanks' 3.68 acres, thereby
separating the 3.68 acres from Blanks' other property. Until 1983,
Menefee regularly maintained the fence and grazed cattle on the
entire fenced tract. In 1983, Grappo purchased Menefee's farm.
However, neither the deed nor the survey indicated that the prop-
erty included Blanks' 3.68-acre tract."
The court first reviewed the evidence relevant to Grappo's claim
that Blanks did not own the property.9 The evidence showed that a
surveyor had matched the monuments on the ground with the
description in the deed to Blanks. The surveyor also testified,
without challenge, that, in his opinion, the property conveyed to
Strickler and Blanks were "one and the same."'1 The court held
that the factually supported and uncontradicted opinion of the
surveyor was sufficient to affirm the trial court's finding that
Blanks owned title to the contested property."
The court then determined, however, that the record supported
a prima facie case of title by adverse possession for Menefee,
Grappo's predecessor in title.' 2 Menefee's possession of the 3.68-
acre tract was actual, hostile, exclusive, visible, and continuous
under a claim of right for more than the fifteen-year statutory pe-
riod."3 The supreme court disagreed with the trial court's determi-
nation that Grappo failed to satisfy the claim of right element and
stated that the claim of right element relates to "a possessor's in-
tention to appropriate and use the land as his own to the exclusion
of all others."' 4 Menefee's intention to possess the 3.68-acre tract
under a claim of right was implied by his using and improving the
8. Id. at 60-61, 400 S.E.2d at 170.
9. Id. at 61, 400 S.E.2d at 170.
10. Id. at 60-61, 400 S.E.2d at 170.
11. Id. at 61, 400 S.E.2d at 170. The court cited Swanenburg v. Bland, 240 Va. 408, 422,
397 S.E.2d 859, 862 (1990), for the proposition that when evidence about the location of
property lines is factually supported, uncontradicted, unimpeached and consistent with evi-
dence in the record, the matter is one of law for the court to determine. See infra notes 171-
80 and accompanying text.
12. Grappo, 241 Va. at 63, 400 S.E.2d at 171.
13. Id. at 61-62, 400 S.E.2d at 170-71; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-236 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
14. Grappo, 241 Va. at 62, 400 S.E.2d at 170-71 (citing Marion Inv. Co. v. Virginia Lin-
coln Furniture Corp., 171 Va. 170, 182, 198 S.E.2d 508, 513 (1938)).
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property as if he owned it.' 5 The court found that there was suffi-
cient evidence to present the issue of adverse possession to the jury
and remanded the case.' 6
C. Assignment of Rents
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, in In re Oceanview/Virginia Beach Real Estate Associa-
tion, 7 recently considered whether hotel room receipts constituted
rent or personalty, an issue of first impression. The matter was
brought before the court on a creditor's motion to prohibit the
debtor's use of cash collateral under section 363(e) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.' The creditor alleged that the debtor's hotel room
receipts were rents subject to the creditor's lien, which was per-
fected through the recordation of an assignment of rents.'
The court examined Virginia law, as well as that of other juris-
dictions, and determined that hotel rent receipts, which other ju-
risdictions have described as being similar to "accounts receiva-
ble," are personalty and not rents when derived from guests
occupying rooms for less than thirty days.20 Since the creditor did
not file a financing statement to perfect a security interest in the
hotel room receipts, the court refused to characterize the receipts
as cash collateral.2 '
Another recent bankruptcy decision provides mortgagees with
some guidance on how to draft assignment language which will en-
title them to collect rental income without fear of violating the au-
tomatic stay in bankruptcy. In In re Townside Partners, Ltd.,22
the court reviewed Virginia law to determine whether post-petition
rents collected by a Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession constituted
15. 241 Va. at 62-63, 400 S.E.2d at 171.
16. Id. at 63, 400 S.E.2d at 171-72.
17. 116 Bankr. 57 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990).
18. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988) (secured creditor may prohibit or condition debtor's
use of cash collateral).
19. In re Oceanview, 116 Bankr. at 58.
20. Id. at 58-59. The court noted that Virginia law distinguishes hotel guests from te-
nants. In particular, the Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§
55-248.2 to .40 (Repl. Vol. 1986 & Cum. Supp. 1990), exempts from its jurisdiction occu-
pancy in a hotel or motel "held out for transients, unless let continuously to one occupant
for more than thirty days." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.5(4) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
21. In re Oceanview, 116 Bankr. at 59. To perfect a security interest in the hotel room
receipts, the creditor needed to file a financing statement in accordance with § 8.9-302 of the
Code. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9-302 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
22. 125 Bankr. 8 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1991).
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cash collateral.
The Townside Partners case involved a wrap deed of trust pur-
suant to which the debtor made a present and irrevocable assign-
ment of rents, effective upon the execution of the deed of trust.23
The court recognized that unless contracted otherwise, a mortga-
gee must take possession of the subject property before it is enti-
tled to receive rental income.24 However, relying on section 55-59
of the Code, the court viewed this deed of trust as a contract that
governed the status of the rents.25 The language of the deed of
trust, when read as a whole, effected an absolute assignment of the
rents immediately upon execution.26 Because the assignment of the
rents to the mortgagee was present and irrevocable, the rents con-
stituted cash collateral in which the mortgagee held an interest
even though the mortgagee was not in possession.2 7
D. Contracts
1. Breach
Does "breach of contract" mean the same thing as "default in
the performance of a contract" where the contract involves the
construction and sale of a residence? The supreme court answered
this question affirmatively in Clevert v. Soden.2 s Soden, a building
contractor, agreed to sell a lot improved with a house to Clevert.29
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 10 (citing Frayser's Adm'r. v. Richmond & A.R.R. Co., 81 Va. 388 (1886) (absent
contractual provisions otherwise, mortgagee must be in possession to collect rental income)).
25. In re Townside Partners, 125 Bankr. at 10-11. Section 55-59 of the Code describes a
deed of trust as being "in the nature of a contract." VA. CODE ANN. § 55-59 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
26. In re Townside Partners, 125 Bankr. at 10. The court acknowledged a potential in-
consistency between language in the deed of trust which stated "[i]n the event of default
and without limiting the generality of the granting clauses hereof, the Grantor specifically
hereby presently and irrevocably assigns. . . all rents. . . due or to become due," and other
language in the deed of trust, but determined that the clauses indicated a present and irrev-
ocable assignment. Id. at 9-10.
27. Id. at 10-11.
28. 241 Va. 108, 400 S.E.2d 181 (1991).
29. Id. at 109, 400 S.E.2d at 182. The contract provided in part that:
[i]f either party defaults in the performance of this contract, such defaulting party
shall be liable for the commission to which the agent would have been entitled if the
contract had been performed and any expenses incurred by the non-defaulting party
or agent, including reasonable attorneys' fees in connection with this transaction and
the enforcement of this contract. The parties further agree that in the event pur-
chaser shall default in the performance of this contract after its acceptance by seller,
the deposit of [$10,000] shall inure to and become the property of [Soden's real estate
agent] and shall be applied as credit on the commission due by the defaulting party.
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Clevert then sued Soden for damages in connection with breaches
of the construction provisions of the contract. Clevert claimed un-
reasonable delays in completion and defective workmanship and
materials. In addition, Clevert sought to recover attorney's fees
and costs incurred in the suit, as provided for in the "default in
the performance" provision of the contract.30 The trial court held
that although Soden breached the contract due to defective per-
formance he did not default in his performance, because he ulti-
mately completed and conveyed the house to Clevert. Therefore,
Soden was not obligated to reimburse Clevert for attorney's fees
and expenses.31
As a threshold matter, the supreme court considered Soden's ar-
gument that the contract provision obligated him to reimburse
Clevert for attorney's fees and expenses only if those costs were
incurred in an attempt to enforce the performance of the entire
contract, which Soden characterized as primarily the sale of real
estate.32 The court rejected this narrow interpretation of the con-
tract, finding that the enforcement of the whole or a portion of the
contract triggered the obligation to pay those expenses.3
The court next considered the issue of default. Soden sought to
ascribe a special meaning to the term "default." Referring to the
harsh penalties imposed on a defaulting party under the contract,
Soden argued that the parties intended that "default" allude to
something "fairly grievous."34 The court did not debate this point,
but found that Soden's delay in completing the house and defec-
tive workmanship were hardly immaterial.3 5
I
In an alternative and novel argument, Soden contended that the
contract was essentially for the sale of real estate. Therefore, only
Soden's failure to convey the property would constitute a default
Id. at 109-10, 400 S.E.2d at 182 (emphasis in original).
30. 241 Va. at 110, 400 S.E.2d at 182.
31. Id. at 110, 400 S.E.2d at 183.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 110-11, 400 S.E.2d at 183 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§
345(b), 346 comment (a) (1981) (enforcement of contract could be based on specific per-
formance or on damages claim for total or partial breach)).
34. Id.
35. Id. Soden delayed 61 days in completing the house. Also, the trial court had awarded
Clevert damages in an amount exceeding 10 percent of the purchase price for the house as
compensation for Soden's defective materials and workmanship. The court regarded such
default as "'fairly grievous' and a material breach of the contract." Id.
[Vol. 25:859
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thereunder. 6 The court noted two flaws in this argument. First, a
comparison of the lot price and the component of the price attrib-
utable to Soden's construction of the house, revealed that Soden's
obligation to construct the house was clearly a material component
of the contract.3 7 Second, Soden overlooked a provision of the con-
tract which, by its terms, would result in a forfeiture of Clevert's
deposit only if Clevert failed to close under the contract.3 8 There-
fore, it was unnecessary to adopt Soden's interpretation of "de-
fault" in order to avoid construing the contract to require Clevert's
forfeiture of the deposit in the event of his breach of some immate-
rial duty. 9
Applying the plain meaning of the term "default," the court de-
termined that Soden's furnishing of defective materials and work-
manship constituted a default under his obligation as a contractor
to build the house in a workmanlike manner.40 Thus, Soden's de-
fective performance constituted a default under the contract.41
The primary issue in Bryant v. Peckinpaugh,42 was whether the
seller of a farm breached his contract with the purchaser or com-
mitted a fraud on the purchaser when he transferred the farm's
tobacco allotment to a third party. A real estate agent showed the
defendant's farm, which was for sale, to Peckinpaugh. Peckin-
paugh asked the agent if the farm had a tobacco allotment, to
which he replied "[F]or these figures you don't need to add it in,
it's insignificant. ' 43 Peckinpaugh then submitted a signed contract
to the agent, who delivered the contract to the seller on December
16, 1985. The contract did not address the tobacco allotment.44
Prior to receiving the contract, the seller had reached an oral
agreement with a third party for the sale of the tobacco allotment.
On the morning of December 16, 1985, the seller transferred by
written instrument the tobacco allotment to the third party in con-
sideration of $8,155.50. 4' The seller then executed the contract for
36. 241 Va. at 110-11.
37. Id. at 111-12, 400 S.E.2d at 183-84.
38. Id. at 112, 400 S.E.2d at 184.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 111, 400 S.E.2d at 183.
41. Id.
42. 241 Va. 172, 174, 400 S.E.2d 201, 202 (1991).
43. Id. at 174, 400 S.E.2d at 202.
44. Id. at 174, 400 S.E.2d at 203.
45. Id.
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the sale of the property to Peckinpaugh." Peckinpaugh did not
learn until April of 1986 that the farm previously had a substantial
tobacco allotment which had been sold.47
On appeal, the supreme court held that Peckinpaugh failed to
prove by clear and convincing evidence all of the elements of
fraud.48 The court characterized the agent's statement about the
tobacco allotment as immaterial.4 9 Additionally the court ruled
that Peckinpaugh had failed to prove the reliance element of an
action for fraud. 0
With respect to the breach of contract claim, the court noted
that even though the contract did not specifically mention the to-
bacco allotment, such allotments run with the land.5 1 Therefore,
the seller's transfer of the allotment to the third party constituted
a breach of contract entitling Peckinpaugh to damages equal to the
reasonable fair market value of the allotment.2
2. Retraction of Repudiation
In Vahabzadeh v. Mooney,53 a case of first impression, the Su-
preme Court of Virginia was asked to determine whether a seller
had effectively retracted his repudiation of a contract for the sale
of land. The parties executed a contract, but on numerous occa-
sions thereafter, the seller stated that he would not sell the prop-
erty unless the purchaser paid an additional $400,000. The pur-
chaser refused to pay the additional sum and demanded that the
seller perform under the contract. The contract set the closing date
for October 23, 1988, with time being of the essence.54
The week before the scheduled closing, the seller sent the pur-
chaser's attorney a letter stating that he would proceed to closing
"provided we can work out a tax-free exchange."55 Neither the
seller nor his attorney made any subsequent efforts to arrange such
46. 241 Va. at 174, 400 S.E.2d at 203.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 175, 400 S.E.2d at 203.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 175-76, 400 S.E.2d at 203.
51. Id. at 176-77, 400 S.E.2d at 204. Transfers of tobacco allotments are governed by the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281 to 1407 (1988).
52. Bryant, 241 Va. at 177-78, 400 S.E.2d at 204-05.
53. 241 Va. 47, 399 S.E.2d 803 (1991).
54. Id. at 48-49, 399 S.E.2d at 804.
55. Id. at 50, 399 S.E.2d at 804.
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an exchange and the October 23, 1988 closing date passed. The
purchaser's attorney rescheduled the closing for November 28,
1988, and notified the seller that the purchaser was ready, willing
and able to close. The seller failed to tender a deed on the resched-
uled closing date. 6
The trial court held that the seller effectively retracted his repu-
diation when he offered to proceed to settlement if a tax-free ex-
change could be arranged. Consequently, the purchaser's request
for an order requiring the seller to perform was denied.5 7 On ap-
peal, the supreme court held that "to be effective, a retraction of a
repudiation must be clear, definite, absolute, and unequivocal in
evincing the repudiator's intention to honor his obligations under
the contract." ' The court found the seller's offer to close if a tax-
free exchange could be arranged to be "indefinite and non-commit-
tal" and not an effective retraction of his earlier repudiation of the
contract.59
3. Specific Performance
A party to a contract cannot unilaterally waive a condition
designed to benefit himself as well as other parties to the contract
and obtain specific enforcement of the contract. Flippo v. F & L
Land Co. 60 involved a four-party contract designed to effect a tax-
free exchange of like-kind property and certain sums of cash by
using an escrow agent to receive and transfer the parties' assets
after various conditions had been satisfied.6 1 The exchange agree-
ment conditioned settlement upon a simultaneous transfer of all
the properties and provided that the agreement could only be
amended by a writing signed by all of the parties. The agreement
also specified a settlement date of July 31, 1988, but time was not
of the essence.2 After several delays, settlement was scheduled for
October 14, 1988, and time was made of the essence. When the
transaction failed to close, F & L terminated the agreement. 3
Flippo initiated a suit against F & L and claimed he was entitled
56. Id. at 50, 399 S.E.2d at 804-05.
57. Id. at 50, 399 S.E.2d at 805.
58. Id. at 51, 399 S.E.2d at 805. The court applied the same standard used to determine
whether a contract has been repudiated.
59. Id.
60. 241 Va. 15, 400 S.E.2d 156 (1991).
61. Id. at 17, 400 S.E.2d at 157.
62. Id. at 18, 400 S.E.2d at 157.
63. Id. at 19-20, 400 S.E.2d at 158-59.
1991]
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to specific performance because he had waived the simultaneous
closing provision of the agreement.6 4
The supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of Flippo's
suit. First, Flippo was not prepared to close; he never delivered
funds and executed documents to the escrow agent, as provided by
the agreement.6 5 Furthermore, the simultaneous closing provision
of the agreement benefitted parties other than Flippo. Therefore,
Flippo had no right to unilaterally waive this condition. 6
4. Tortious Interference
In Century-21, Gail Boswell & Associates v. Elder,67 the su-
preme court considered whether a real estate agent's activities
amounted to tortious interference with a contract for the purchase
of a house and lot. The Blankses executed a written contract to
purchase property from Elder conditioned on the closing of the
sale of the Blankses' home. Subsequently, Dowdy, a real estate
sales agent unaware of the contract between Elder and the
Blankses, provided the Blankses with prices of other homes near
the Elder property and showed them other properties in which
they expressed an interest.68
Disputes arose between the Blankses and Elder regarding the ac-
curacy of certain representations made by Elder with respect to
the property.6 9 Consequently, the Blankses decided to sign a con-
tract to purchase another house shown to them by Dowdy. While
Dowdy was preparing the contract, the Blankses informed Dowdy
that they had already entered into a contract to purchase the
Elder property but that the contract was conditioned on the sale of
the Blankses' home. Dowdy told the Blankses that if the condition
was satisfied, the Blankses would be obligated to purchase the
Elder property. Nevertheless, the Blankses proceeded to contract
64. 241 Va. at 18, 400 S.E.2d at 157.
65. Id. at 21-22, 400 S.E.2d at 159. The trial court's decision was based on six findings: (1)
performance under the agreement required the participation of all the parties; (2) it was not
established that a simultaneous transfer was possible; (3) the conditions of the agreement
could not be unilaterally waived; (4) amendment of the agreement had to be in writing
signed by all the parties; (5) it was not established that the parties were ready to settle or
that they had delivered any funds or documents; and (6) it was not shown that the escrow
agent was in a position to perform. Id. at 20-21, 400 S.E.2d at 159.
66. Id. at 22, 400 S.E.2d at 160.
67. 239 Va. 637, 638, 391 S.E.2d 296, 297 (1990).
68. Id. at 639-40, 391 S.E.2d at 297-98.
69. Id. at 639-40, 391 S.E.2d at 298.
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for the purchase of the other property and subsequently purchased
it after selling their own home. Elder then sued Dowdy for tortious
interference with contractual rights. 0
The court found that Elder had failed to establish that Dowdy
engaged in intentional interference that induced or caused the
Blankses to breach the contract with Elder.7 ' The evidence indi-
cated that Dowdy showed the Blankses additional properties at
their request; that the Blankses requested information about the
prices of other homes near the Elder property; and that the
Blankses contracted to purchase the other property after Dowdy
explained their liability under the contract with Elder.
7 2
E. Deeds
In Gilbert v. Summers, 73 Gilbert sought to establish title to ap-
proximately fifteen acres of timberland by either deed or adverse
possession. Both Gilbert and Summers derived title to their parcels
from Miller. However, their respective chains of title contained dif-
ferent property descriptions. 4 When experts were unable to locate
various landmarks used in the 1905 deed from Miller to Summers'
predecessor in title, the experts turned to a 1906 deed and subse-
quent deeds in the chain of title. This later deed contained a dif-
ferent metes and bounds description of the property and favored
Summers. 5
The supreme court determined that the conflicting expert testi-
mony as to the location of certain landmarks in the 1905 deed did
not render the deed ambiguous. Rather, it merely raised an issue of
fact for the jury to determine the location of those landmarks
based on extrinsic evidence. 76 The court then held that the trial
court erred by admitting into evidence the 1906 deed and subse-
quent deeds.77
The supreme court also determined that the record lacked suffi-
cient evidence to support Gilbert's claim of title by adverse posses-
70. 239 Va. at 640, 391 S.E.2d at 298.
71. Id. at 642, 391 S.E.2d at 299.
72. Id.
73. 240 Va. 155, 393 S.E.2d 213 (1990).
74. Id. at 156, 393 S.E.2d at 213.
75. Id. at 157, 393 S.E.2d at 214.
76. Id. at 158, 393 S.E.2d at 214-15 (citing 2 MINOR, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 1076
n.1 (F. Ribble 2d ed. 1928)).
77. Id. at 158-59, 393 S.E.2d at 215.
1991]
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sion. 8 Since the record showed that the property contained no
dwellings and had not been cultivated, the elements of adverse
possession had not been satisfied.7 9 While Summers' predecessors
in title had cut timber and raised cattle on the property, nothing
in the record indicated the length of time or the location of these
activities.8 0
F. Deed of Trust Priority
In United States v. Lomas Mortgage, USA,"' the United States
District Court for the Western District of Virginia was asked to
determine the rights of various parties whose liens on a parcel of
land had been incorrectly indexed and recorded. Specifically, the
government sought an injunction against foreclosure proceedings
and a declaration of the rights of various parties in land subject to
Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) trust deeds. Poff Con-
struction, Inc. originally owned and subdivided the land in dispute
and developed Tyson Hills subdivision.2 Poff obtained a construc-
tion loan from the National Home Acceptance Corporation (prede-
cessor of Lomas) to finance the construction of a house on the dis-
puted lot in the subdivision. The loan was secured by a recorded
deed of trust.83
Poff then conveyed the lot to the Chrisleys, who purchased it
with a loan from the FmHA. The Chrisleys did not assume, nor did
Poff pay, the National loan. Furthermore, the closing attorney for
the Chrisleys, relying upon the property description in the grantor
index when searching the title, found only a lien for the benefit of
Virginia National Bank, which was paid from part of the sale pro-
ceeds. Unknown to the parties, the index incorrectly showed the
lien from Poff to National on another lot rather than the lot ac-
quired by the Chrisleys 4 Additionally, Poff continued to meet the
obligations of the loan without informing National or Lomas of the
conveyance to the Chrisleys.8 5
The Chrisleys then conveyed the property to Foultz, who also
78. 240 Va. at 160, 393 S.E.2d at 215-16.
79. Id. at 160, 393 S.E.2d at 216 (citation omitted).
80. Id.
81. 742 F. Supp. 936, 937-38 (W.D. Va. 1990).
82. Id. at 937.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 938.
85. Id.
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made the purchase with, a FmHA loan. Again, the conveyance was
made without Lomas' knowledge and the National loan was
neither assumed nor paid. Furthermore, the new closing attorney
searched title back only to the point certified by the previous clos-
ing attorney and failed to find National's recorded deed of trust.8 6
Six years later, Poff filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition and
stopped making payments on the loan. The government obtained a
temporary injunction against any foreclosure on the property. The
government argued that even though the National deed of trust
was recorded prior to the FmHA deed of trust, the National deed
of trust did not have priority because it was mis-indexed. There-
fore, the government did not have notice of the prior deed of trust.
Lomas argued that despite the mis-indexing, the government had
constructive notice of the National deed of trust.87
The court stated that whether or not the deed of trust was prop-
erly indexed was not a justiciable issue because section 55-96 of the
Code provides that "[r]ecordation of an instrument constitutes
constructive notice of the instrument to all subsequent purchasers
and mortgagees."8 Additionally, the court held that the person de-
livering the instrument for recordation is not responsible for
proper indexing."' Consequently, because there was constructive
notice in this case, the National deed of trust had priority over the
subsequent FmHA deeds of trust.90
G. Easements
1. Implied Easements
The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the elements necessary
to establish an implied easement in Stoney Creek Resort v. New-
man.9 1 The plaintiffs had acquired lakefront property by a deed
which incorporated restrictions and conditions set forth in a sales
86. 742 F. Supp. at 938.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 939.
89. Id.
90. Id. The court also found unpersuasive the government's equitable defenses of estoppel
and unclean hands to Lomas' foreclosure under the National deed of trust. The court stated
that even if Poff had fraudulently represented that no other deeds of trust encumbered the
property at the time the Chrisleys acquired the property, neither National nor Lomas could
be held responsible for the misrepresentation. Id.
91. 240 Va. 461, 397 S.E.2d 878 (1990).
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contract previously recorded with a separate deed.92 The condi-
tions permitted lot owners to use the lake if they were members in
good standing of the Singers Mountain Lake Outdoor Club. The
plaintiffs and other lot owners used the lake and facilities for four-
teen years without challenge until the lake property was conveyed
to Stoney Creek Resort, Inc. From that time on, Stoney Creek de-
nied the plaintiffs' use of the lake unless they paid a $4,000.00 an-
nual fee.93
The defendants argued that the original deed and contract cre-
ated only personal obligations upon the grantors to allow the plain-
tiffs to use the lake. The supreme court rejected this argument and
found that the lot owners had an easement to use the lake.9 4 The
court found sufficient evidence that the use of the lake was "con-
tinuous, apparent, reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the
property conveyed, and in existence at the time of the convey-
ance."95 These facts established the existence of an implied ease-
ment in favor of the lot owners.96
In Russakoff v. Scruggs,97 the owners of lakefront properties al-
leged that they were entitled to easement rights to use an adjoin-
ing lake. The lake, originally owned by developers of a subdivision,
escheated to the state when they stopped paying taxes on the lake
property.98 Scruggs then purchased the lake property at a tax sale
and, after building a fence around the lake and posting "no tres-
passing" signs thereon, sent a notice to the owners of the lakefront
lots that they would be required to pay an annual fee to use the
lake.99
The Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the lot owners
had established an easement by implication. 100 The record showed
92. 240 Va. at 463, 397 S.E.2d at 879.
93. Id. at 463-64, 397 S.E.2d at 880.
94. Id. at 464-65, 397 S.E.2d at 880.
95. Id. at 466-67, 397 S.E.2d at 881.
96. Id.
97. 241 Va. 135, 400 S.E.2d 529 (1991).
98. Id. at 137, 400 S.E.2d at 531.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 139-41, 400 S.E.2d at 532-33. The court set forth the elements of an easement
as follows: "(1) the dominant and servient tracts [must] originate from a common grantor,
(2) the use [must have been] in existence at the time of the severance, and ... (3) the use
must be apparent, continuous, and reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the dominant
tract." Id. at 139, 400 S.E.2d at 532 (citations omitted). Justices Russell and Compton, how-
ever, expressed in their dissent that the lakefront lot owners' claim should have been barred
by laches. The lakefront lot owners delayed four years before bringing the suit, during which
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that (1) the lakefront lots and the lake property originated from a
single tract of land; (2) the lake property was a servient tract used
by the lakefront lot owners; and (3) the use of the lake property for
boating, ice skating and as a source for lawn sprinkler systems was
apparent at the time of Scruggs' acquisition, and was continuous
and reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the lakefront
properties.101
2. Prescriptive Easements
In Umbarger v. Phillips,o2 Umbarger appealed a trial court de-
cision granting Phillips a prescriptive easement across Umbarger's
land. Phillips' driveway, which was situated along the common
boundary line between the parties' properties, extended on to
Umbarger's property for distances up to sixteen feet. Constructed
in 1945, the driveway had been used daily for ingress and egress to
Phillips' property. In 1985, Umbarger erected a fence which
blocked part of Phillips' driveway. Phillips removed the fence and
sought to enjoin Umbarger from further interference with the right
of way. 03
The supreme court examined the elements necessary to establish
a prescriptive easement and determined that Phillips had estab-
lished a rebuttable presumption that the use of the driveway was
under a claim of right.104 More importantly, the court rejected
Umbarger's contention that the prescriptive easement failed be-
cause Umbarger did not have actual knowledge of and did not ac-
time Scruggs had invested over $5,000 on physical improvements to the lake. Id. at 142, 400
S.E.2d at 534.
101. 241 Va. at 139-41, 400 S.E.2d at 532-33.
102. 240 Va. 120, 122, 393 S.E.2d 198, 198 (1990).
103. Id. at 122-23, 393 S.E.2d at 99.
104. Id. at 124, 393 S.E.2d at 199-200. The elements necessary to establish a right of way
by prescription are that the use must be "adverse, under a claim of right, exclusive, continu-
ous [for at least 20 years], uninterrupted, and with the knowledge and acquiescence of the
owners of the land over which it passes," Id. (quoting Ward v. Harper, 234 Va. 68, 70, 360
S.E.2d 179, 181 (1987)). A presumption that the use is under a claim of right is created
where the use of the right of way is open, visible, continuous and exclusive for more than 20
years. Id., 393 S.E.2d at 200.
Phillips presented evidence that the driveway was used daily for ingress and egress for
almost 40 years, and that they had "posted the driveway as private." Id. Nevertheless,
Umbarger argued that Phillips could not claim the use was adverse because the daughter of
the owners of the driveway testified at trial that the driveway was believed to have been
constructed on Phillips' property. The court rejected this argument stating that a third
party's assumption as to the user's intentions about the property was insufficient evidence
to prove a mistaken intent. Id. at 124-25, 393 S.E.2d at 200.
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quiesce to the adverse use of her property, even though the use was
open, visible, and uninterrupted for almost forty years.1"5 The
court then articulated for the first time the standard to be applied
in determining whether the owner of a servient estate has knowl-
edge of the adverse use of her property. It stated that "[i]f the
nature of the use was such that a reasonable person would discover
its existence; i.e., open, continuous, uninterrupted, and obvious,
the presumption [of an easement by prescription] arises, and it en-
compasses the elements of the landowner's knowledge of the
use."
10 6
H. Eminent Domain
In Sheffield v. Department of Highways and Transportation,1 0 7
the supreme court considered for the first time whether the com-
mon law action of ejectment is available to a landowner whose
property has been taken wrongfully and without compensation for
"highway purposes" by the state.10 8 The state had condemned a
parcel of land belonging to Mabel Farnsworth and Leona Farns-
worth Eads. After the condemnation, the heirs of A.B. Lowe
claimed ownership of the property and inquired into their rights as
to the condemned property. They decided not to pursue their
claim against the state for compensation. However, Sheffield pur-
chased the property from the Lowe heirs several years later and
filed an ejectment action against the state.10 9
The court noted that the object of an action for ejectment is to
determine who holds title and who is entitled to possession of real
property. °0 The court then stated that permitting ejectment suits
against the state would be adverse to the public interest because it
could result in the interruption of the public use of streets and
highways."' The court agreed that landowners are entitled to en-
105. 240 Va. at 125-26, 393 S.E.2d at 200-01.
106. Id. at 126, 393 S.E.2d at 201. The court, noting that its rule conformed with rules
adopted by the majority of other states, opined that a rule requiring the owner to have
actual knowledge would "unfairly favor the absent or careless landowner." Id. (citing
THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY, § 340, at 194 (1990)).
107. 240 Va. 332, 397 S.E.2d 802 (1990).
108. Id. at 333, 397 S.E.2d at 802.
109. Id. at 333-34, 397 S.E.2d at 802-03.
110. Id. at 335, 397 S.E.2d at 803.
111. Id. at 336, 397 S.E.2d at 804. The supreme court also stated that a landowner's con-
stitutional right is for just compensation, not for possession. Id.
Throughout the proceedings, the state asserted sovereign immunity as a bar to the land-
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force their rights to just compensation in a common law action. 112
However, it ruled that the common law action of ejectment was not
an appropriate remedy by which to pursue an inverse condemna-
tion claim against the state."'
In Hamer v. School Board,"4 the landowners appealed the trial
court's condemnation of approximately fifty acres of property
which the school board of the City of Chesapeake planned to use
for a public high school. On appeal, the landowners challenged the
necessity of the taking, contended that the school board should
have carried the burden of proof as to the determination of just
compensation and the selection of the site, and demanded a new
trial because of improper remarks made by counsel for the school
board." '5
The supreme court, addressing the owners' contention that the
school board should have borne the burden of proof as to the ne-
cessity of the taking, stated that the necessity of a taking is a legis-
lative question not subject to review, provided a public purpose for
the taking has been shown."' However, the landowners' contention
that the selection of the condemned site was arbitrary and capri-
cious was entitled to judicial review. The supreme court ruled that
the burden of persuasion and of going forward with evidence estab-
lishing a prima facie case that the condemned site was selected ar-
bitrarily and capriciously or with manifest fraud rests upon the
condemnee. 1 7 The condemnor must then produce sufficient evi-
dence to show that the issue was fairly debatable. In this case, the
landowners failed to establish a prima facie case."'
The landowners also alleged that the trial court erred in not as-
signing to the board the burden of proving just compensation." 9
owner's suit. Id. In finding that an ejectment action is not a remedy available to landowners
against the state under these circumstances, the supreme court assumed, but did not decide,
that sovereign immunity would not bar such an action. Id.
112. 240 Va. at 336, 397 S.E.2d at 804.
113. Id.
114. 240 Va. 66, 69, 393 S.E.2d 623, 625 (1990).
115. Id. at 69, 393 S.E.2d at 625.
116. Id. at 70, 393 S.E.2d at 625-26. The court noted that § 15.1-237 of the Code imposes
some limitation on condemnation for certain specific purposes, imposing a judicial review of
the necessity of those takings. However, public school uses are not uses which require judi-
cial review pursuant to section 15.1-237. Id. at 70-71, 393 S.E.2d at 626; see VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-237 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
117. Hamer, 240 Va. at 71-72, 393 S.E.2d at 626.
118. Id. at 72, 393 S.E.2d at 627.
119. Id.
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On this issue of first impression, the court, after reviewing the his-
tory of condemnation law in England and Virginia, upheld the trial
court's holding that the burden-of-proof principles applicable to
actions at law are inapplicable to the determination of just com-
pensation in condemnation proceedings. 120
Even though the supreme court upheld the trial court on three
of the four issues presented on appeal, the court ultimately re-
versed and remanded the case for a new trial on the just compen-
sation issue.12' The court agreed with the landowners that remarks
by the board's counsel repeatedly appealed to the commissioners'
personal financial interests as taxpayers and were sufficiently im-
proper and prejudicial to warrant a new trial. 22
I. Gifts Causa Mortis
The supreme court addressed causa mortis gift delivery in
Brown v. Metz. 2 ' This case is discussed in another article in this
survey.124
J. Insurance
1. Home Warranty
Cobert v. Homeowner's Warranty Corp.2 5 involved a breach of
contract action brought by owners of a new home seeking warranty
performance from a home warranty corporation and a home war-
ranty insurer. The supreme court was asked to decide whether the
120. 240 Va. at 72-74, 393 S.E.2d at 627-28. Commissioners are charged with indepen-
dently ascertaining the value of condemned property. Unlike a jury, commissioners are not
bound by expert opinion and are not required to make their determination based on the
weight of the evidence presented. Id. at 73-74, 393 S.E.2d at 627-28.
The landowners in Hamer also failed to prevail on their theory that landowners have the
right to open and close final arguments. Case law in Virginia gives the condemnor the right
to open and close condemnation proceedings. Id. at 74, 393 S.E.2d at 628 (citing Ryan v.
Davis, 201 Va. 79, 84-85, 109 S.E.2d 409, 414 (1959)).
121. Id. at 75-76, 393 S.E.2d at 628-29.
122. Id. The board's counsel had asked one expert witness "[fls that what you are going
to pay your money for?" and, during rebuttal argument, he instructed the commissioners to
"[b]e fair, but be fair to yourself when you come in with your award." Id. at 75, 393 S.E.2d
628. In his dissent, Justice Compton did not view the comments as sufficiently egregious to
warrant a new trial because the compensation award was within the range of conflicting
evidence. Id. at 76-77, 393 S.E.2d at 629 (Compton, J., dissenting).
123. 240 Va. 127, 129, 393 S.E.2d 402, 403 (1990).
124. See Johnson, Wills, Trusts, and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U.
RICH. L. REV. 925 (1991).
125. 239 Va. 460, 391 S.E.2d 263 (1990).
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homeowners were third-party beneficiaries under the insurance
documents entered into by the builder, the home warranty corpo-
ration, and the home warranty insurer. 12 6
The homeowners informed their builder of several defects in
their house which the builder failed to correct. The homeowners
then pursued their claims against the home warranty insurer as
third-party beneficiaries under the policy. The informal dispute
settlement procedure did not produce satisfactory results and the
homeowners subsequently initiated suit.12 7
The trial court decided that the homeowners were not third-
party beneficiaries under the home warranty corporation's prod-
ucts liability coverage provided to the builder. The supreme court
reversed this ruling and found that the contract documents clearly
intended to benefit the homeowners.' 28 The court relied on the
contract documents' definition of "purchaser" as a beneficiary of
the insurance coverage and their provision for payments to the
purchaser for builder defaults and major structural defects.129
2. Title Insurance
In Brenner v. Lawyers Title Insurance Corp.,3 0 the owners of
adjoining property claimed a prescriptive easement over a corner
of Brenner's property where a portion of a concrete driveway pro-
vided the only access from the adjoining property to a public
street. 3' The disputed portion also included land which was previ-
ously conveyed to the City of Alexandria for a storm sewer ease-
ment. Lawyers Title refused to defend Brenner against the adjoin-
ing property owners' prescriptive easement claim because
126. Id. at 461, 391 S.E.2d at 263.
127. Id. at 464, 391 S.E.2d at 265.
128. Id. at 466, 391 S.E.2d at 266.
129. Id. The supreme court rejected the home warranty corporation's argument that the
contract documents were controlled by the federal Product Liability Risk Retention Act and
not state law. Id. at 465-66, 391 S.E.2d at 265. Congress enacted the Product Liability Risk
Retention Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3901 to 3906 (1988), in 1981 to enable businesses to create risk
retention groups where manufacturers, including home builders, could self-insure. The court
determined that the federal legislation does not change or preempt the tort or contract law
of the states. Cobert, 239 Va. at 465, 391 S.E.2d at 265-66 (citing Home Warranty Corp. v.
Elliott, 572 F. Supp. 1059, 1061 (D. Del. 1983); Home Warranty Corp. v. Caldwell, 777 F.2d
1455, 1473 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986)).
130. 240 Va. 185, 397 S.E.2d 100 (1990).
131. Id. at 187, 397 S.E.2d at 101. The facts revealed continuous use of the driveway for
over 43 years. Id. at 190, 397 S.E.2d at 102. Brenner knew of the existence and daily use of
the driveway when she purchased the property. Id. at 191, 397 S.E.2d at 103.
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Brenner's owner's policy contained a survey exception."3 2
Brenner alleged that the claim against her property affected the
entire storm sewer easement area, not just the driveway portion,
and that the insurer had a duty to defend against such a claim on
title.1 33 The supreme court, however, disagreed and determined
that the prescriptive easement claim applied only to the area af-
fected by the driveway and that the duty of the insurer to defend
applies only to the actual claim. The driveway would have been
disclosed by a survey and thus fell within the survey exception of
the policy.134 Because Lawyers Title would not have been liable for
any judgment stemming from the prescriptive easement claim, it
had no duty to defend against the claim.13 5
K. Landlord and Tenant
1. Continuous Use Clause
In Bradlees Tidewater v. Walnut Hill Investment, Inc.,36
Bradlees appealed an injunction ordering it to operate a retail bus-
iness on leased premises for not less than six hours a day, six days
a week. The landlord obtained the injunction to enforce the con-
tinuous use provision in Bradlees' lease.13 7 Bradlees, the anchor
tenant in the shopping center, had entered an agreement to assign
its lease to the Hechinger Company. The landlord objected to the
assignment because Hechinger did not plan to occupy the
premises.138
The landlord claimed that the loss of Bradlees as the anchor
132. Id. at 190, 397 S.E.2d at 102. The survey exception denied coverage for encroach-
ments or matters not of record that would have been revealed by an accurate survey. Id.
133. 240 Va. at 191, 397 S.E.2d at 103. Brenner based this allegation on language in the
quitclaim deed to the abutting landowners which conveyed the grantor's right, title and
interest to that portion of Villa Site "A" (Brenner's property) which was subject to the
storm sewer easement granted to the city. Id. at 190-91, 397 S.E.2d at 103.
134. Id. at 192, 397 S.E.2d at 103. The court acknowledged that coverage may have been
afforded under the policy if a claim had been made against the larger easement area pursu-
ant to the quitclaim language, for "[t]he insurer's obligation to defend is broader than its
obligation to pay." Id. at 189, 397 S.E.2d at 104 (citing Lerner v. General Ins. Co. of
America, 219 Va. 101, 102, 245 S.E.2d 249, 251 (1978)). But such a claim was not made. Id.
Thus, "if it appears clearly that the insurer would not be liable under its contract for any
judgment based upon the allegations, 'it has no duty even to defend.'" Id. (quoting Trav-
elers Indem. Co. v. Obershain, 219 Va. 44, 46, 245 S.E.2d 247, 249 (1978)).
135. Id. at 193, 397 S.E.2d at 104.
136. 239 Va. 468, 391 S.E.2d 304 (1990).
137. Id. at 469, 391 S.E.2d at 305.
138. Id. at 470, 391 S.E.2d at 305.
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tenant would cause the center to lose its economic viability and
that an exception to the general rule that irreparable damages
must be proven should apply for the landlord's benefit. 139 The
court rejected this argument and stated that the landlord failed to
prove irreparable damage in support of its request for an
injunction. 140
The court noted that the five-year-period set forth in the lease,
during which Bradlees was required to function as an anchor ten-
ant, had expired. Additionally, by the terms of the lease, Bradlees
was free after that same five year period to assign its interest in
the lease, in whole or in part, to any lawful retail business.' 4'
Those lease provisions significantly weakened the landlord's argu-
ment that the shopping center's economic well-being rested on the
continued operation of the Bradlees store. Therefore, the court
ruled that the trial court erred in granting injunctive relief because
the landlord failed to prove irreparable damages.142
2. Use Restrictions
The primary issue in Marriott Corp. v. Combined Properties,
Ltd. Partnership,'43 was whether the phrase "drive-in food estab-
lishment" in a use restriction clause of Marriott's lease prohibited
the landlord from leasing space to McDonald's Corporation for the
purpose of constructing and operating a McDonald's restaurant. In
1967, predecessors of Marriott and the landlord entered into a
lease which contained the following non-competition provision:
Landlord covenants that Landlord will not at any time during the
continuance of this Lease directly or indirectly engage primarily in
the business of operating a drive-in food establishment within an
area of 2,000 feet in any direction of the Leased Premises; nor will
Landlord, except with respect to present tenants of property owned
by Landlord presently engaged in such business, sell, rent, or permit
139. 239 Va. at 472, 391 S.E.2d at 306. The landlord, citing Southern R. Co. v. Franklin &
P.R. Co., 96 Va. 693, 32 S.E. 485 (1899), argued that an injunction is an appropriate remedy
when a lease requires continued operation of a business and "where clear and uncontra-
dicted evidence of the breach and resulting injury is presented." Id. The court found South-
ern, which dealt with the effect of a statute requiring forfeiture of an abandoned railroad on
an agreement by which a lessee was bound to operate a railroad, inapposite to the case at
bar. Id.
140. Id. at 473, 391 S.E.2d at 307.
141. Id. at 475, 391 S.E.2d at 308.
142. Id.
143. 239 Va. 506, 391 S.E.2d 313 (1990).
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any land owned or controlled by Landlord to be used for such pur-
pose during such period in such area. With respect to property sold
or leased by Landlord subject to the restrictions of this Section, ap-
propriate covenants will be made a part of any deed or lease in order
to accomplish the objectives hereof.144
The supreme court deferred to the trial court's conclusion that
in 1967 the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase "drive-in
food establishment" referred to one of two types of establish-
ments.145 One was a car-hop or curbside service type establishment
where the customer parked his car on the lot, placed his order, had
the order delivered to the car, and consumed the food in the car.
The other type of establishment required the customer to park on
the lot, leave the car, purchase his food at a window, and return to
his car to consume the food. 46 In both cases, food was consumed in
cars on the lots.
The proposed McDonald's restaurant, the court noted, would in-
clude inside seating for 122 customers and a "drive through" fea-
ture where the customer places and picks up his order from a win-
dow and then drives away. In addition, the court noted that only
about one percent of McDonald's food is eaten in cars on parking
lots.147
The supreme court upheld the trial court's determination that
the parties' intent at the time the lease was executed was to pro-
tect Marriott from competition from drive-in food establishments
of the two types discussed above.148 The proposed McDonald's did
not fall into the prohibited category. The court refused to expand
the protection afforded by the plain meaning of the non-competi-
tion provision to include all similar competitors, even though those
competitors evolved from the establishments targeted in the
provision. 49
144. 239 Va. at 508, 391 S.E.2d at 314.
145. Id. at 509-10, 391 S.E.2d at 315.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 511, 391 S.E.2d at 316.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 512, 391 S.E.2d at 317.
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3. Insurable Interests
In Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Glick,5 ' the Supreme Court of
Virginia interpreted a lease and a liability insurance policy. Greca,
Ltd. ("Greca") leased the first floor of a building from the Glicks.
Pursuant to the lease, Greca's liability insurance, carried by
Scottsdale Insurance Company ("Scottsdale"), listed the Glicks as
additional insureds.'5 ' Subsequently, a police officer and a fireman
investigating a reported burglary at the building were injured when
an exterior stairway leading from the first floor to the second floor
collapsed. The officer and the fireman sued Greca and the Glicks.
However Scottsdale refused coverage under the liability policy.15 2
Greca and the Glicks sought a declaratory judgment interpreting
the lease and the insurance policy.
Scottsdale and Greca challenged the trial court's determination
that the stairway was a part of the leased premises and covered by
the policy. While the court disagreed with the trial court that the
stairway was a part of the leased premises, it determined that
Greca nevertheless had an insurable interest in the stairway.153
The court found that notwithstanding Greca's lack of any legal or
equitable property interest in the stairway, Greca did have an in-
surable interest in the safety of persons who may bring suit to re-
cover damages, such as the officer and fireman. 154 The court deter-
mined that the burglary investigation was incidental to the
operation of the restaurant, and, therefore, within the coverage af-
forded by the liability policy. 55
The court also interpreted an indemnification provision in the
lease which provided as follows:
Tenant agrees that he will indemnify and save the Landlord harm-
less from any and all liability, damage, expense, cause of action, suit,
150. 240 Va. 283, 397 S.E.2d 105 (1990).
151. Id. at 285, 397 S.E.2d at 106.
152. Id. at 286, 397 S.E.2d at 107.
153. Id. at 288, 397 S.E.2d at 107. The leased premises described in the lease included
"the first floor of the building with improvements thereon." Id. at 286, 397 S.E.2d at 107.
The court noted that the "stairway was neither a part of the first floor nor an 'improvement
thereon.'" Id. at 287, 397 S.E.2d at 107.
154. Id. at 287, 397 S.E.2d at 107.
155. Id. at 289, 397 S.E.2d at 108. The policy insured against damages incurred by Greca
because of bodily injury "caused by an occurrence and arising out of the ownership, mainte-
nance or use of the insured premises and all operations necessary or incidental thereto."
Id. at 288, 397 S.E.2d at 108 (emphasis in original).
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claim or judgment arising from injuries to person or property on the
demised premises, or upon the adjoining sidewalks or parking lots
which arise out of any alleged act, failure to act or negligence of
Tenant, its agents or employees. 156
Even though the court stated that this language did not constitute
an unqualified obligation to indemnify the Glicks, it did require
Greca to indemnify the Glicks against the acts or omissions of
Greca. Nevertheless, since the Glicks were named as additional in-
sureds in the liability policy, Scottsdale was still obligated to de-
fend the Glicks. 15
7
L. Lien Enforcement
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered the validity of a lie-
nor's sale of a motor vehicle at public auction in Newport News
Shipbuilding Employees' Credit Union v. B & L Auto Body. 58
This case is discussed in another portion of this survey.'59
M. Mechanic's Liens
In the case In re Richardson Builders,6 0 the court considered
whether the bankruptcy of a general contractor stays the suits of
subcontractors to enforce mechanics' liens, even though the general
contractor has no interest in the real property to which the liens
attach. A subcontractor sought relief from the automatic stay. The
bankruptcy court noted that relief from the automatic stay is nec-
essary before enforcement of a subcontractor's mechanic's lien be-
cause a general contractor is a necessary party under Virginia
statutes. 6'
Under Virginia law, a subcontractor can only enforce a lien
against a general contractor if the owner owes the general contrac-
tor money. Therefore, the indebtedness of the owner to the general
contractor will always be an issue in a subcontractor's claim.6 2 Ad-
ditionally, under section 362(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code, the in-
156. Id. at 290, 397 S.E.2d at 109.
157. 240 Va. at 290, 397 S.E.2d at 109.
158. 241 Va. 31, 400 S.E.2d 512 (1991).
159. See Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REV.
681 (1991).
160. 123 Bankr. 736 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1990).
161. Id. at 739; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 43-7, -9 (Repl. Vol. 1990).
162. In re Richardson, 123 Bankr. at 738-40.
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debtedness of the owner to the general contractor is included in
the debtor's estate.16 Since both the owner and the general con-
tractor may have interests to protect or advance in an enforcement
action by a subcontractor, the court concluded that the automatic
stay does apply to a subcontractor's mechanic's lien enforcement
action against a general contractor who does not possess an owner-
ship interest in the real property."" Therefore, relief from the stay
is a condition to pursuing enforcement of the lien."6 5
N. Real Estate Brokers
In Kuga v. Chang,166 the sellers of a residence appealed from a
trial court order granting a real estate agent her commission and a
share of the earnest money deposit, even though the purchaser
procured by the agent refused to close on the property. The pur-
chaser found another home which he preferred over the Kuga
home and repudiated the contract. Contrary to the trial court's
findings, the sellers contended that the contract language, which
made the commission payable on the sales price and deductible
from the sale proceeds, made the employment contract a special
contract rather than a general contract.16 7
The supreme court determined that both the listing agreement
and the sales contract, when read together, were the employment
contract between the seller and the agent.6 8 The listing agreement
entitled the agent to a commission upon producing a ready, willing
and able purchaser. The deposit forfeiture provision in the sales
contract was not sufficient to transform this general employment
163. Id. at 738; 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1989).
164. In re Richardson, 123 Bankr. at 738. The court noted that applying the automatic
stay to subcontractors' enforcement suits against general contractors who had petitioned for
bankruptcy promoted two policies. The stay prevents a race to the courthouse by subcon-
tractors, and it prevents similar creditors from being treated differently in the bankruptcy.
Id. at 741.
165. Id. at 738.
166. 241 Va. 179, 182, 399 S.E.2d 816, 818 (1991).
167. Id. at 181-82, 399 S.E.2d at 818. Under a general contract of employment, an agent
enjoys an inchoate right to the commission set forth in the contract if he produces a pur-
chaser who is ready, willing, and able to perform under the terms of the contract, and who is
accepted by the seller. Id. The inchoate nature of the agent's right to the commission was
emphasized by the supreme court. The right becomes actionable if the failure to close is not
due to the fault of the agent, regardless of whether it is the seller or the purchaser who
defaults. Id. If the parties condition the payment of the commission upon the receipt of the
purchase price or some other event, then the contract of employment is considered "special"
and not governed by the above-stated rule. Id. at 183, 399 S.E.2d at 819.
168. Id. at 184, 399 S.E.2d at 819.
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contract into a special contract.8 9 The court also rejected the sell-
ers' argument that the real estate agent should have been limited
to a share of the forfeited deposit pursuant to the forfeiture provi-
sion. The forfeiture provision provided the agent with an option by
which the agent could obtain her commission, not an "exclusive
source of compensation . . . in the event of default by the
purchaser."'1 0
0. Riparian Rights
Swanenburg v. Bland'"' involved a dispute among three land-
owners whose adjoining properties fronted on the north side of a
navigable river. The owners of the peripheral lots obtained an in-
junction which prohibited the owner of the middle lot from con-
structing a pier extending to the line of navigation.1 2 On appeal,
the owner of the triangularly shaped middle lot claimed that his
lot lines, if extended into the river, would converge at a point
south of the mean low-water mark, thus giving him statutory ripa-
rian rights.17 3
The supreme court agreed with the middle lot owner, reversed
the trial court's finding, and remanded the case to have the middle
lot owner's riparian rights determined. 4 The trial court erred in
deciding that the mean low-water mark was south of the point of
convergence of the middle lot owner's lot lines without probative
evidence to support that finding. The only probative evidence
before the trial court which located the mean low-water mark was
uncontradicted testimony presented by the middle lot owner's sur-
veyor.17 5 The evidence submitted by a surveyor retained by the
owners of the peripheral lots and relied upon by the trial court
failed to indicate where the mean low-water mark was located and
contained no factual basis. Because the testimony of the middle lot
169. Id. at 184-85, 399 S.E.2d at 819-20.
170. 241 Va. at 184-85, 399 S.E.2d at 819-20. The forfeiture provision of the contract
provided that if the purchaser failed to close then the deposit could be forfeited at the
option of the seller and/or the agent. If forfeited, the deposit would be divided equally be-
tween the seller and agent. Id.
171. 240 Va. 408, 397 S.E.2d 859 (1990).
172. Id. at 410, 397 S.E.2d at 860.
173. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-2 (Repl. Vol. 1987). Section 62.1-2 of the Code provides
that the rights and privileges of landowners whose property is situated on rivers extends to
the mean low-water mark.
174. Swanenburg, 240 Va. at 413-14, 397 S.E.2d at 862.
175. Id. at 412, 397 S.E.2d at 861.
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owner's surveyor was uncontradicted, the supreme court ruled that
the trial court should have found in favor of the middle lot
owner.
176
In Zappulla v. Crown,77 the Supreme Court of Virginia consid-
ered the authority of the Marine Resources Commission ("MRC")
to determine the riparian rights of private landowners. The MRC
had granted a permit to Crown, the operator of a marina, to con-
struct additional piers and boat slips. The adjoining landowner,
Zappulla, alleged that the enlargement of the marina would en-
croach upon his underwater flats and sought a declaratory judg-
ment to determine his riparian rights and to void the MRC's ac-
tions as to any determination of his riparian rights. The trial court
ruled that the MRC decision was dispositive and res judicata be-
cause no appeal had been taken from the MRC decision.178
The supreme court held that "the sole jurisdiction to resolve
conflicting private riparian claims is vested in a court of equity.M79
The MRC has jurisdiction only to determine the rights of an appli-
cant and the public in state-owned bottomlands. The MRC's ac-
tion in issuing a permit to one riparian landowner had no effect on
the private rights of another riparian landowner. 80
P. Taxation
Whether a tax assessor gave proper consideration to contract
rent as relevant evidence of economic rent when assessing two
commercial properties in Fairfax County was at issue in Tysons
International, Ltd. Partnership v. Board of Supervisors.'"' Tysons
176. Id. at 414, 397 S.E.2d at 862. The court found that the testimony given by the sur-
veyor retained by the peripheral lot owners lacked a factual basis. "If a surveyor does not
have a factual basis for his location of a property line, his conclusion regarding its position is
not evidence of its location." Id. (citing Gilbert v. Summers, 240 Va. 155, 159-60, 392 S.E.2d
213, 215 (1990)); see infra notes 73 to 80 and accompanying text.
177. 239 Va. 566, 391 S.E.2d 65 (1990).
178. Id. at 568, 391 S.E.2d at 66.
179. Id. at 569, 391 S.E.2d at 67.
180. Id. at 570-71, 391 S.E.2d at 67-68; see VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-3 (Cum. Supp. 1991)
(MRC authority to issue permits for wharves in waters opposite those of riparian
landowners).
181. 241 Va. 5, 400 S.E.2d 151 (1991). This same issue regarding Fairfax County's eco-
nomic rent methodology of assessing commercial property has been considered by the su-
preme court on four previous occasions and each time it was found that contract rent had
not been properly considered. Id. at 7, 400 S.E.2d at 151; see Smith v. Board of Supervisors,
234 Va. 250, 361 S.E.2d 351 (1987); Nassif v. Board of Supervisors, 231 Va. 472, 345 S.E.2d
520 (1986); Board of Supervisors v. Donatelli & Klein, 228 Va. 620, 325 S.E.2d 342 (1985);
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argued that the county, in capitalizing the income from the proper-
ties, considered market rent but failed to consider contract rent.'82
The supreme court found that the actual income and expenses
submitted by the taxpayers as evidence of contract rent were not
used for calculating market rent because the assessor viewed them
as too low and not indicative of economic rent.183 Instead, the as-
sessor had used a formula based on market data, figures produced
by the county from surveys of rental income and expenses reported
by taxpayers, and information from deeds, deeds of trusts, and on-
site inspections of buildings.18 4 The supreme court ruled that the
assessor's methodology for calculating economic rent was faulty be-
cause he failed to factor contract rent into the formula.185 The
court adopted Tysons' actual rent as the fair market value of the
properties for purposes of the assessment and relieved Tysons
from any erroneous taxes. 186
The Virginia Constitution requires that property tax assess-
ments must be based on the property's fair market value. 8 7 In Ar-
lington County v. Department of Taxation,"8 the supreme court
was asked to determine whether the unit method, an appraisal
technique used to assess railroad real estate, was constitutional.
The case involved 420 acres of property in northern Virginia
owned by the Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad
(RF&P) and known as the Potomac Yard. 8 "
In 1984, the task of assessing railroad properties shifted from the
State Corporation Commission ("SCC") to the Department of Tax-
Fairfax County v. Nassif, 223 Va. 400, 290 S.E.2d 822 (1982).
182. Tysons Int'l, Ltd. Partnership, 241 Va. at 8, 400 S.E.2d at 152. Economic rent is the
amount a typical tenant is willing to pay for premises during a certain period of time. Id. at
6 n.1, 400 S.E.2d at 151 n.1. Contract rent is the actual income and expenses relating to the
premises. Id.
183. 241 Va. at 10, 400 S.E.2d at 154.
184. Id. at 8-9, 400 S.E.2d at 152-53. After determining income, losses and expenses are
then deducted to derive an expense ratio and a net operating income for the building being
assessed. The actual income and expenses of the building are then compared to the county's
estimated economic rent derived from the market data. Id.
185. Id. at 12, 400 S.E.2d at 155.
186. Id. at 12-13, 400 S.E.2d at 155. In his dissent, Justice Compton stated that the tax-
payers' evidence of actual income and expenses needed only to be considered, not adopted.
Id. at 13, 400 S.E.2d at 155 (Compton, J., dissenting). He stated that the trial court's finding
that the county had reviewed the taxpayers' evidence should be binding on appeal. Id.
187. VA. CONST. art. X, § 2.
188. 240 Va. 108, 393 S.E.2d 194 (1990).
189. Id. at 110, 393 S.E.2d at 195. The Potomac Yard is used as a railroad marshalling
yard. Id.
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ation ("Department"). The SCC had used a market value review of
comparable properties to appraise the Potomac Yard, but when
the Department appraised the land in 1984, it used the unit
method.190 The unit method resulted in much lower appraisals
upon which the local taxing jurisdictions, such as Arlington
County, could apply its tax rates. Arlington County's "Application
For Correction of Erroneous Assessment" was denied by the trial
court and the county appealed. 91
The Department argued that it was within the tax commis-
sioner's field of discretion to use the unit method of appraisal.192
The county argued that the Department was without legal author-
ity to use the unit method. 93 The supreme court stated that real
estate assessments should be based on the property's fair market
value determined by considering "its highest and best use in its
particular location."' 9 4 The Department's appraisal of the Poto-
mac Yard reflected its fair market value as part of the railroad
unit, but not its fair market value in its particular location. The
court held that the unit method is not an appropriate method of
appraisal when it does not reflect the fair market value of the spe-
cific property. 9 5 Therefore, the court ruled that the Department's
assessments of the Potomac Yard were not valid because they did
not reflect the fair market value of the property in its particular
location, as required by the state constitution. 96
190. Id. at 110-11, 393 S.E.2d at 195-96. The unit method considers all of the railroad
property as a single operating unit. The first step in the formula is to capitalize the rail-
road's weighted average net income by dividing it by the weighted average cost of debt or
equity. Then estimated values of certain types or units of railroad properties are deducted
from the capitalized value. The assessed value is then divided proportionately among the
local taxing jurisdictions. Id. at 108-110, 393 S.E.2d at 185. The unit method is a component
of the capitalization of income method, which is one of the generally accepted approaches
used to assess real estate. Id. at 112, 393 S.E.2d at 196-97.
191. Id. at 110-11, 393 S.E.2d at 195-96. The Potomac Yard was appraised at $80,820,700
by the SCC market value review in 1983 and at $6,882,152 by the Department unit method
in 1984. Id.
192. Id. This argument was based on §§ 58.1-202(1) and 58.1-2655 of the Code. See VA.
CODE ANN. § 58.1-202(1) (Repl. Vol. 1991) (commissioner has power to ascertain best
method); Id. § 58.1-2655 (assess railroad real property on best, most reliable information).
193. County Board of Arlington County, 240 Va. at 112, 393 S.E.2d at 196.
194. Id. (emphasis in original).
195. Id. at 112-14, 393 S.E.2d at 190-97. The Department's appraisal was found to be the
Potomac Yard's "use value" defined as "the value a specific property has for a specific
use." Id. at 112, 393 S.E.2d at 196 (quoting AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF REAL ESTATE APPRAIS-
ERS, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 20 (9th ed. 1987 (emphasis in original)).
196. Id. at 114, 393 S.E.2d at 197.
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Q. Zoning
1. Changed Circumstances
In Seabrooke Partners v. City of Chesapeake,197 the supreme
court considered whether changed circumstances operated to
divest Seabrooke Partners, the owner of a 9.88 acre parcel, of its
rights to multi-family zoning. The key issue in Seabrooke Partners
was whether the residential character of the neighborhood sur-
rounding the parcel zoned multi-family residential had changed
sufficiently to justify the city's downzoning of the property to the
lower density classification of single family dwellings." 8 The origi-
nal thirty-four-acre tract, of which the 9.88 acre parcel was a part,
had been previously rezoned from single-family to multi-family,
but was never developed as multi-family. The original owner devel-
oped approximately one-half the tract as single-family, under the
condition that the remaining property would be downzoned. The
owner contracted to sell the 9.88 acre parcel to Seabrooke, which
intended to construct an apartment complex. Soon thereafter, the
city downzoned the property to single-family, and Seabrooke chal-
lenged the downzoning. 199
Applying well-settled principles of judicial review, the court pre-
sumed that the city's legislative action of downzoning the subject
parcel was reasonable. 00 However, the court stated that in
downzoning cases:
[w]hen an aggrieved landowner makes a prima facie showing that
since enactment of the prior ordinance there has been no change in
circumstances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or
welfare, the burden of going forward with evidence of such mistake,
fraud or changed circumstances shifts to the governing body. If the
governing body produces evidence sufficient to make reasonableness
fairly debatable, the ordinance must be sustained.20
Seabrooke Partners advanced a prima facie showing of unreasona-
bleness through the testimony of an expert who stated that the
neighborhood contained a variety of single and multi-family resi-
197. 240 Va. 102, 393 S.E.2d 191 (1990).
198. 240 Va. at 103, 393 S.E.2d at 192.
199. Id. at 103-04, 393 S.E.2d at 192-93.
200. Id. at 105, 393 S.E.2d at 193.
201. Id. at 106, 393 S.E.2d at 193 (citing Fairfax County v. Snell Corp., 214 Va. 655, 658-
59, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892-93 (1974)).
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dences and that there had been no change in circumstances since
the city rezoned the parcel for multi-family use. The city, however,
defined the neighborhood as the entire thirty-four-acre tract plus
adjacent areas, most of which were zoned single-family. The city
contended that the neighborhood had changed to the extent that a
multi-family use would have been surrounded by single-family
homes. 02 The court upheld the downzoning, finding that the city's
evidence of reasonableness in downzoning the parcel based on
changed circumstances was sufficient to characterize the need for
the downzoning as fairly debatable. 203
2. Conditional Use Permits
In County of Lancaster v. Cowardin, °4 the county appealed the
trial court's decision overturning the county's denial of the appli-
cations of two landowners for conditional use permits to construct
boathouses on their respective properties. The properties of both
landowners were zoned A-2, which permitted boathouses with a
conditional use permit.20 5
Because both zoning enactments and rulings on applications for
conditional use permits constitute legislative action, the supreme
court applied the "fairly debatable" analysis used in Seabrooke to
the county's denial of the conditional use permits.20 6 The court de-
termined that the denial of the conditional use permits was proba-
tive evidence of unreasonableness because the relevant zoning ordi-
nance specifically permitted boathouses in A-2 districts.0 7 The
burden then fell on the county to produce evidence of reasonable-
ness sufficient to make the issue fairly debatable. Upon examining
the facts and circumstances of each case, the court determined
that the county had carried its burden. 08 One of the landowners
did not possess a certificate of occupancy, a condition precedent to
the issuance of a conditional use permit. The county denied the
other landowner's application because the location of a boathouse,
202. Id. at 106-07, 393 S.E.2d at 193-94.
203. 240 Va. at 107, 393 S.E.2d at 194.
204. 239 Va. 522, 524, 391 S.E.2d 267, 268 (1990).
205. Id. at 523 n.1, 391 S.E.2d at 268 n.1.
206. Id. at 525, 391 S.E.2d at 269. The presumption of legislative validity can only be
overcome with probative evidence of unreasonableness that is so strong that no evidence of
reasonableness would be sufficient to make the issue fairly debatable. Id. at 526, 391 S.E.2d
at 269.
207. Id. at 526, 391 S.E.2d at 269.
208. Id. at 527, 391 S.E.2d at 269.
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where no others existed, would have adversely affected the local
waterway. 0 9
3. Referenda
In R.G. Moore Building Corp. v. Committee for the Repeal of
Ordinance R(C)-88-13,21 0 the supreme court was asked to decide
whether the referendum provisions of the municipal charter of the
City of Chesapeake apply to zoning amendments. 1 The contro-
versy began when, contrary to the planning commission's recom-
mendation, the Chesapeake City Council approved a landowner's
application to rezone 691 acres of agricultural real estate to single-
family residential and conservation categories. Individuals opposed
to the rezoning formed the Committee for the Repeal of Ordinance
R(C)-88-13. When the city council refused to repeal the zoning
amendment, the Committee petitioned the circuit court for a refer-
endum decree and a special election.212 The landowner responded
by filing a petition for a declaratory judgment that the referendum
provisions were not applicable to rezoning ordinances. At a consoli-
dated hearing, the trial court ruled that the referendum ordinance
applied to the zoning amendment, and the voters subsequently
voted against the rezoning.213
Agreeing with the trial court's determination, the supreme court
reasoned that a referendum is a reserved power which allows the
voters to ratify or reject decisions of elected representatives; and,
therefore, is not an improper delegation of power 4.2 1 The court also
rejected the landowner's contention that a referendum was not ap-
plicable in this case because referenda apply only to legislative
acts, while rezoning is an administrative act.215 The court held that
"rezoning ordinances are legislative acts, and not administrative,
209. Id. at 526, 391 S.E.2d at 269.
210. 239 Va. 484, 391 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
211. Id. at 486, 391 S.E.2d at 587. Section 3.07 of the Chesapeake City Charter provides
that ordinances, other than an emergency measure or annual appropriation, become effec-
tive 30 days after passage. However, a petition by a specified number of voters may be filed
with the City Clerk within that 30-day period requesting the ordinance be amended or re-
pealed. If the City Council fails to amend or repeal the ordinance, the petitioners may re-
quest the circuit court to order a referendum to submit the ordinance to the voters in a
special election. R. G. Moore, 239 Va. at 486-87, 391 S.E.2d at 588.
212. Id. at 486-87, 391 S.E.2d at 587-88.
213. Id. at 488, 391 S.E.2d at 588.
214. Id. at 489, 391 S.E.2d at 589.
215. Id. at 491, 391 S.E.2d at 590.
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and thus are subject to referendum. 2 1 6
4. Spot Zoning
In Barrick v. Board of Supervisors,217 residents of Mathews
County alleged that the county board of supervisors arbitrarily and
capriciously rezoned parcels of land from Residential-1 (R-1) to
Business-2 (B-2) in order to permit development of condominiums.
The residents challenged the rezonings as incompatible with the
mostly residential and some B-1 uses which surrounded the subject
parcels. 18
The supreme court reviewed the record and determined that the
residents produced probative evidence of unreasonableness be-
cause the B-2 use varied from and was incompatible with the com-
prehensive plan and zoning ordinance.219 However, the evidence
did not establish illegal spot zoning since the plaintiffs failed to
address the legislative purpose of the rezoning, a critical element of
the test for illegal spot zoning.220
If the purpose of a zoning ordinance is solely to serve the private
interests of one or more landowners, the ordinance represents an ar-
bitrary and capricious exercise of legislative power, constituting ille-
gal spot zoning; but if the legislative purpose is to further the wel-
fare of the entire county or city as a part of an overall zoning plan,
the ordinance does not constitute illegal spot zoning even though
private interests are simultaneously benefitted. 221
The court found that the record included sufficient evidence to
make the reasonableness of the board's rezoning fairly debata-
ble.222 For example, the county's comprehensive plan permitted
four units per acre on the waterfront property. In addition, the
board presented evidence that the zoning ordinance, which pro-
vided that B-2 designations are generally not located on the water-
216. Id. at 491, 391 S.E.2d at 591.
217. 239 Va. 628, 630, 391 S.E.2d 318, 319 (1990).
218. Id. at 631-32, 391 S.E.2d at 320.
219. Id. at 633, 391 S.E.2d at 320.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 632, 391 S.E.2d at 320 (quoting Wilhem v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 403-04, 157
S.E.2d 920, 924 (1967) (quoting Kozenik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 113, 131
A.2d 1, 11 (1957))).
222. Id. at 635, 391 S.E.2d at 322.
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front, did not prohibit the rezoning.223 Further, evidence of reason-
ableness was found in the staff reports and minutes of the board
meeting.22 4 Because the legislative purpose of the rezoning fur-
thered the welfare of the entire county, and not solely the interests
of private landowners, the court held that reasonableness of the
rezoning was fairly debatable, and, therefore, valid. 25
5. Vested Rights
The Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a developer
acquired vested rights in the zoning classification of his property in
Stephens City v. Russell.226 Intending to build three apartment
buildings, the developer purchased property zoned to permit
thirty-three units. The developer subsequently filed a revised site
plan and a subdivision plat. Neither the revised site plan nor the
subdivision plat were approved by any government official before
the town amended the zoning ordinance to reduce the number of
units permitted from thirty-three to twenty-one. The developer as-
serted, and the trial court agreed, that he had acquired a vested
property right in the pre-amended zoning classification. 27
On appeal, the town argued against the developer's claim of sub-
stantial compliance and asserted that the developer had not met
the legal requirements because of certain deficiencies in the
plan.228 The supreme court agreed. Applying the principle set forth
in Fairfax County v. Medical Structures,229 Fairfax County v. Cit-
ies Service,230 and Notestein v. Board of Supervisors,231 that there
223. Id. at 633, 391 S.E.2d at 321.
224. 239 Va. at 634, 391 S.E.2d at 321-22. The staff recommended the rezoning on the
condition of accepting the proffer which limited the use under the B-2 classification to resi-
dential only. Remarks by the board indicated that the rezoning was a compatible use with
numerous community benefits, such as creating taxable revenue and desirable housing for
the area. Id. at 634-35, 391 S.E.2d at 321-22.
225. Id. at 635, 391 S.E.2d at 322.
226. 241 Va. 160, 399 S.E.2d 814 (1991).
227. Id. at 162, 399 S.E.2d at 815.
228. Id. The revised site plan failed to locate "sidewalks, omitted an erosion control plan
and landscape plan and was not approved by the state highway department. Id. The subdi-
vision plat was pending when the town adopted the amendment. Id.
229. 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972) (vested right acquired when special use permit
granted, site plan filed and substantial expense incurred).
230. 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972) (vested right acquired when special use permit is-
sued and site plan filed).
231. 240 Va. 146, 393 S.E.2d 205 (1990) (no vested right to operate landfill when no sig-
nificant governmental act supported claim); see infra notes 234 to 243 and accompanying
text.
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must be some official government act to support a claim of a vested
property right, the court found that the trial court had erred.2 32
The developer had not obtained any "governmental permit or ap-
proval" and, therefore, had not acquired a vested right in the for-
mer zoning classification.233
In Notestein v. Board of Supervisors,234 the owners of approxi-
mately 600 acres of land in Appomattox County challenged the va-
lidity of a zoning ordinance prohibiting the operation of a non-haz-
ardous waste landfill on their property. The owners applied for a
landfill permit from the Virginia Department of Waste Manage-
ment to operate the facility. The department notified the county of
the application and demanded that the county respond within
thirty days concerning whether the landfill was consistent with the
county's zoning ordinance, or waive any violation of the ordi-
nance.235 At that time, no zoning ordinance existed which would
prohibit the issuance of a permit to the owners. Within the thirty-
day period, the county notified the department of unspecified ob-
jections to the permit. The owners, in good faith reliance on the
county administrator's representations that no legal basis existed
to prohibit the operation of the landfill, obtained financing for the
development of the landfill. Additionally, the owners rejected sev-
eral offers to buy the land for up to $2,600 more per acre than
previous offers that were based on the agricultural value of the
property.236
The owners then learned that the board of supervisors was con-
sidering the adoption of a new zoning ordinance which would in-
clude agricultural districts and environmental districts. The county
administrator and several members of the board represented to the
owners that any change to the zoning ordinance would not affect
the owners' ability to operate the landfill.231 The ordinance, which
the county subsequently adopted, located the owners' property in
an agricultural district where the development and operation of a
landfill was prohibited. The county's landfill, however, fell within
the environmental hazard district in which landfills are permitted
with a special use permit. The county then advised the department
232. Russell, 241 Va. at 164, 399 S.E.2d at 816.
233. Id. at 162, 399 S.E.2d at 815.
234. 240 Va. 146; 393 S.E.2d 205 (1990).
235. Id. at 148-49, 393 S.E.2d at 206.
236. Id. at 149, 393 S.E.2d at 206.
237. Id. at 150, 393 S.E.2d at 207.
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that the zoning ordinance prohibited the development and opera-
tion of the owners' landfill.23 8
The owners sought to overturn the zoning ordinance on a num-
ber of grounds, only three of which will be considered here. First,
the Notesteins argued that the board violated section 15.1-493(C)
of the Code239 because the county's landfill was placed in a more
intensive district than that disclosed in the public advertisement.
The board argued that since the environmental hazard classifica-
tion did not permit any use as of right, it was more restrictive than
the agricultural classification, and therefore no additional public
hearing was required under the Code.2 40 The supreme court, una-
ble to discern whether the location of the county landfill in the
environmental hazard classification constituted a more or less in-
tensive classification, determined that if the owners successfully
proved that the county placed its landfill in a more intensive zon-
ing classification, the ordinance would be invalid.2 41
The supreme court rejected the owners' second theory, finding
no significant official act on the county's part, such as the issuance
of a special use permit, to support the owners' claim of vested
rights.242 The court also rejected the owners' third assertion: the
county's failure to respond to the department's inquiry resulted in
238. Id.
239. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493(C) (Cum. Supp. 1990). Section 15-1.493(C) provides as
follows:
Before approving and adopting any zoning ordinance or amendment thereof, the gov-
erning body shall hold at least one public hearing thereon, pursuant to public notice
as required by § 15.1-431, after which the governing body may make appropriate
changes or corrections in the ordinance or proposed amendment. . . . However, no
land may be zoned to a more intensive use classification than was contained in the
public notice without an additional public hearing after notice required by § 15.1-431.
Such ordinances shall be enacted in the same manner as all other ordinances.
Id.
240. Notestein, 240 Va. at 153, 393 S.E.2d at 208.
241. Id. at 153, 393 S.E.2d at 209 (citing Town of Vinton v. Falcun Corp. 226 Va. 62, 306
S.E.2d 867 (1983)).
242. Id. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at 208 (citing Fairfax County v. Medical Structures, 213 Va.
355, 356-57, 192 S.E.2d 799, 800-01 (1973) (issuance of special use permit constituted signifi-
cant official act); Fairfax County v. Cities Service, 213 Va. 359, 362, 193 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1972)
(similar holding)).
One might ask what possible significant official action could the county have taken to
support the owners' vested rights because, under the county zoning ordinance in effect at
the time, no requirement for a special use permit or other affirmative action on behalf of the
county, except a favorable response to the department's inquiry, was required to approve
the landfill. Apparently, the county's favorable response or no response to that inquiry
would have constituted a significant official action.
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a waiver of any conflict. The court stated that "[t]he county can-
not be deemed to have waived its right to object to the issuance of
a permit because no zoning ordinance existed at the time of the
required certification. 2
43
III. LEGISLATION
A. Condominium Act
The Condominium Act underwent a number of modifications
during the 1991 session of the General Assembly. Except as pro-
vided in section 55-79.74:3 of the Code,244 an institutional lender
which acquires title to a condominium unit is not a "declarant" as
defined in section 55-79.41 of the Code, unless the lender offers to
convey title to the unit to anyone not in the business of selling real
estate for his own account.245 Additionally, the definition of "com-
mon profits" has been deleted from the Code.246
The General Assembly also added a provision to several provi-
sions of section 55-79.43 of the Code. Section 55-79.43(B) now pro-
vides that the declarant may record condominium instruments
prior to applying for or obtaining subdivision approval if a site
plan approval has been obtained.247 One new subsection, section
55-79.43(C) of the Code, prescribes requirements for the subdivi-
sion of land which can no longer be added to an expandable condo-
minium.24s Another new subsection, section 55-79.43(D) of the
Code, provides that the association and its authorized agents are
the proper parties to apply for subdivision site plan approval and
rezoning requests, notwithstanding the fact that the association
does not own the land upon which the condominium is located.
The applications, however, must not adversely affect the rights of
the declarant to develop additional land. The section also clarifies
that the unit owners are responsible for obtaining building and oc-
cupancy permits for the units, and the association is responsible
243. 240 Va. at 154, 393 S.E.2d at 209. With respect to the Notestein's estoppel argument,
the court reiterated the familiar rule that "'[e]stoppel does not apply to the government in
the discharge of its governmental functions.'" Id. at 152, 393 S.E.2d at 208 (quoting Gwinn
v. Alward, 235 Va. 616, 621, 369 S.E.2d 410, 413 (1988)).
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.41:3 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
245: Id. § 55-79.41.
246. See Id. (editor's comments on 1991 amendment); see infra notes 259-60 and accom-
panying text.
247. Id. § 55-79.43(B).
248. Id. § 55-79.43(C).
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for obtaining permits for the common elements.24
In addition to the Uniform Statewide Building Code, local ordi-
nances regulating road construction and utilities installation must
be applied to condominiums in the same manner that they are ap-
plied to other buildings of similar form and nature of occupancy. 250
Further, the association now bears the burden of recording an
amendment to the declaration effecting the reassignment of lim-
ited common elements. The unit owner or owners concerned must
first pay the association the reasonable costs for the preparation
and recordation of the amendment.251
Where a common element is assigned as a limited common ele-
ment pursuant to section 55-79.54(a)(6) of the Code, the declarant
must prepare and record the amendment at no cost to any unit
owner. 252 Otherwise, the association must prepare and record the
amendment effecting the assignment after the concerned unit
owner or owners concerned pay the association the reasonable
costs for the preparation and recordation of the amendment. 253 A
copy of the amendment must also be delivered to the concerned
unit owner or owners. 254 Section 55-79.57(D) of the Code, a new
section, authorizes the association to record an amendment effect-
ing the assignment of common elements as limited common ele-
ments in accordance with the assignment rights reserved in the
condominium instruments, if the declarant failed to record such an
amendment prior to the time that the declarant ceased to be a unit
owner.
255
Section 55-79.58(C) of the Code was revised to permit the de-
clarant to rely on previously recorded plats and plans in converting
convertible land or adding additional land to an expandable condo-
minium, provided that the certifications required by section 55-
249. Id. § 55-79.43(D). However, in the case of convertible land, the declarant is respon-
sible for obtaining permits. Id.
250. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.43(F).
251. Id. § 55-79.57(B).
252. Id. Section 55-79.54(a)(6) of the Code provides that the declaration for the condo-
minium must describe common elements, outside of convertible lands, which may be as-
signed as limited common elements. The declaration must also include a statement that the
common elements may be so assigned and the manner in which the assignment must be
effected. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.54(a)(6) (Repl. Vol. 1986).
253. Id. § 55-79.57(C) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
254. Id. § 55-79.57(C).
255. Id. § 55-79.57(D).
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79.59 of the Code are recorded.256 Therefore, the declarant can
avoid the expense of preparing new plats to effect such conversions
or additions. In addition, the declarant may rely on plats and plans
recorded pursuant to section 55-79.54(a), (b) and (c) of the Code in
lieu of new plats and plans to satisfy the requirements of sections
55-79.56(b), 55-79.61(B) and 55-79.63 of the Code if the declarant
records the certifications required by sections 55-79.58(A) and (B)
of the Code.257 A savings provision has been added to section 55-
79.59 of the Code for condominium instruments recorded prior to
July 1, 1991.258
The General Assembly deleted the phrase "and rights to com-
mon profits" from section 55-79.69(D) of the Code which now re-
quires the association to record an amendment to the condomin-
ium bylaws that reallocates the liability for common expenses upon
the relocation of boundaries between units.259 The association must
prepare and record the amendment effecting the reallocation of
common expenses after the concerned unit owner or owners pay
the association the reasonable costs for the preparation and recor-
dation of the amendment. 2
60
The condominium instruments may provide a formula for the
diftribution of rights in the assets of the association upon the ter-
256. Id. § 55-79.58(C). The certifications required by § 55-79.59 of the Code include,
among other things, certifications by a licensed land surveyor, licensed engineer or licensed
architect that the improvements depicted on the plat or plan have been substantially com-
pleted and that the plat or plan is accurate. Id. § 55-79.58(A),(B), and (C). However, the
recordation of both new plans and certifications are required to effect the conversion of
convertible space into units or common elements. Id. § 55-79.58(D).
257. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.59.
258. Id. The savings provision states: "All condominium instruments for condominiums
created prior to July 1, 1991, are hereby validated notwithstanding that the plats were pre-
recorded as if in compliance with this section and not recorded with amendments converting
convertible land or adding additional land if the plats or subsequent amendments contained
the required certifications." Id.
259. Id. § 55-79.69(E). The same language was deleted from § 55-79.70(D) of the Code
regarding the allocation of common profits to new units created upon the subdivision of
existing units, § 55-79.72(P) of the Code regarding the declarant's right to unilaterally
amend the condominium instruments to correct errors in the instruments, and § 55-
79.72(H) of the Code regarding the disposition of common profits upon the termination of a
condominium. Section 55-79.82 of the Code, which provided for the allocation of common
profits to common expenses and the distribution of common profits to unit owners, has been
repealed. Act of Mar. 22, 1991, ch. 497, 1 1991 Va. Acts 767, 785.
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.69(F) (Cum. Supp. 1991). The association also has the burden
of recording an amendment to the condominium instruments for the purpose of reallocating
the costs of the common expenses upon the subdivision of an owner's unit, provided that
the subdivider pays the association for its reasonable costs in preparing and recording the
amendment. Id. § 55-79.70(F).
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mination of the condominium other than in proportion to the own-
ers' respective undivided interests in the common elements. 61
The General Assembly made several changes to the voting proce-
dures for members of condominium associations. Where members'
votes are cast by proxy, "any proxy shall terminate after the first
meeting held on or after the date of that proxy or any recess or
adjournment of that meeting held within thirty days. ' 2 2 Votes al-
located to units owned by the association must be included for the
purpose of determining whether a quorum is present at meetings
of the members of the association. Such votes are deemed to be
cast in the same proportion as the votes cast by individual unit
owners.
2 6 3
The General Assembly also granted the association additional
authority with respect to the common elements of the condomin-
ium. This additional authority includes the right to assert, defend,
and settle claims related to the common elements during and after
the declarant control period, but not claims involving the declarant
during his control period." 4
The General Assembly amended section 55-79.80:1 of the Code
to provide that the owner of a unit may pay a percentage of the
total amount due under a judgment for money against the condo-
minium association and thereby have the lien removed from his or
her unit.26 5 This percentage is equal to the unit owner's share of
common expenses. 66
The General Assembly also altered the requirements for public
offering statements prepared in connection with the sale of units in
conversion condominiums. Specifically, it modified the representa-
tions regarding asbestos inspections and asbestos abatement if as-
bestos has been found.267
Upon the resale of a unit by an owner other than the declarant,
the information which the owner is required to provide to the pur-
chaser must include "[a] statement of whether the condominium
or any portion thereof is located within a development subject to
261. Id. § 55-79.72(H).
262. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.77(D).
263. Id. § 55-79.77(F).
264. Id. § 55-79.80(B).
265. Id. § 55-79.80:1(D).
266. Id.
267. Id. § 55-79.94(A)(5).
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the Property Owners' Association Act (§ 55-508 et seq.) of Chapter
26 of this title. 268
B. Conveyance by Husband and Wife
Section 55-41 of the Code, which provides that a writing signed
by a husband and wife purporting to convey any estate, real or
personal, operates to convey all of the spouse's right, title and in-
terest in the estate conveyed thereby, now applies to all writings,
whether or not executed before January 1, 1991.269
C. Eminent Domain
The General Assembly adopted a number of amendments to the
condemnation procedures set out in the Code. For example, the
definition of "freeholder" was added to section 25-46.3 of the
Code.27 0 The General Assembly substituted "enhancement" for
"peculiar benefits" in section 25-46.7(3) of the Code.27 1 A sentence
was also added to section 25-46.7(6) of the Code, which requires
the clerk of the circuit court to index the petition of condemnation
against the names of all of the owners of the property subject to
condemnation where two or more separate parcels of land are
joined in the same petition. 2
Sections 25-46.20(B) and 25-46.20:1 through :5 of the Code es-
tablish the new procedures by which condemnation commissioners
must be appointed when the Commonwealth Transportation Com-
missioner is the condemnor in a county with the urban county ex-
ecutive form of government, or in a city adjacent to such a county,
or in a county contiguous to any such county, or in a city adjacent
to a county adjacent to a county with the urban county executive
form of government .2 7 These amendments become effective on De-
268. Id. § 55-79.97(A)(10). In addition, the General Assembly relaxed the requirement
that the information include a disclosure of all pending suits or judgments against the asso-
ciation. The information must only disclose the nature and status of pending suits or judg-
ments to which the association is a party "which either could or would have a material
impact on the association or the unit owners or which relates to the unit being purchased."
Id. § 55-79.97(A)(6).
269. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-41. For a discussion of related issues see Johnson, Wills, Trusts,
and Estates: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REv. 925 (1991).
270. Id. § 25-46.3. "'Freeholder' means any person owning an interest in land in fee, in-
cluding a person owning a condominium unit." Id.
271. Id. § 25-46.7(3).
272. Id. § 25-46.7(6).
273. Id. §§ 25-46.20(B); Id. §§ 25-46.20:1 to :5. Condemnation commissioners must be
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cember 1, 1991 and expire on July 1, 1994.274
D. Escheats and Disposition of Unclaimed Property
In this past session, the General Assembly modified the require-
ments which a banking or financial institution must satisfy in or-
der to impose charges or cease accruing interest on accounts in its
possession. The General Assembly increased from twenty-five dol-
lars to fifty dollars the value of an account in an institution's pos-
session for which it may not make assess charges for dormancy or
inactivity in excess of charges for active accounts or cease to pay
interest unless the institution has first given the owner of the ac-
count three months notice of the imposition of the charges or ces-
sation of the accrual of interest.275 The General Assembly also re-
wrote section 55-210.3:01(B)(3) of the Code to prevent financial
institutions from charging accounts or ceasing the accrual of inter-
est on accounts unless it does not reverse or cancel charges or ret-
roactively credit accrued interest to accounts once the charges have
been imposed or the accrual of interest ceased, except to correct
documented internal errors.276
The General Assembly reduced from seven years to five years
the period of time after which an intangible interest in a business
association is presumed abandoned when the owner of the interest
has neither claimed a dividend nor corresponded in writing with
the association, provided that the association does not know the
location of the owner at the end of the five-year period.2 77 Section
55-210.6:1(B) of the Code was amended by the deletion of the
phrase "or is held or owing by a business association whose records
indicate that the last known address of the person entitled thereto
is in this State. '278
The seven-year statute of limitations contained in section 55-
210.25 of the Code was also rewritten.2 79 Finally, section 55-210.6
disinterested freeholders residing in the county or city where the property subject to the
condemnation action is located. Id. § 25-46.20:1.
274. 1 1991 Va. Acts 838.
275. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.3:01(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
276. Id. § 55-210.3:01(B)(3).
277. Id. § 55-210.6:1(A).
278. Id. § 55-210.6:1(B).
279. Id. § 55-210.25. The section now provides, in part, that "[tihe administrator shall
commence enforcement for compliance with the provisions of this Act within seven years,
unless the holder has failed to file a report required under § 55-210.12. The holder may
waive in writing the protection of this section." Id.
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of the Code was repealed.280
Real property owners should not expect to escape liability for
hazardous waste contamination by abandoning contaminated prop-
erty. The General Assembly has granted the Virginia Waste Man-
agement Board of the Department of Waste Management the au-
thority to pursue prior owners of contaminated property for clean-
up costs. 28 '
E. Housing
1. Virginia Housing and Development Authority
The General Assembly has authorized the Virginia Housing and
Development Authority ("VHDA") to supervise a housing sponsor
who receives a VHDA mortgage loan to finance the ownership and
operation of housing developments and multi-family residential
housing intended for occupancy by low and moderate income peo-
ple during the time that the VHDA mortgage loan is outstanding
"and thereafter as necessary to preserve the federal tax exemption
of the notes or bonds issued by [V]HDA to finance such [V]HDA
mortgage loan. ' '282 Identical language was added to section 36-
55.33:(D)(4) of the Code, with respect to mortgage loans made by
VHDA to housing sponsors or persons of low or moderate income
for the construction, rehabilitation, preservation or improvement
of housing developments or residential housing. 28 3 The same lan-
guage was added to section 36-55.34:1 of the Code, which sets forth
the manner in which the VHDA may supervise a housing sponsor
and its real and personal property.284
Additionally, the General Assembly added language to section
36-55.34:1 of the Code to allow that where an agreement providing
for the regulation or supervision of housing is recorded in the land
280. 1 1991 Va. Acts 546; see VA. CODE ANN. § 55-210.6 (Repl. Vol. 1986) (repealed 1991)
(providing conditions for presumption of abandonment of stock held or owing by business
association).
281. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-182.2 (Cum. Supp. 1991). The new section provides as follows:
In addition to any other remedy provided by law, the Virginia Waste Management
Board, pursuant to its authority granted in § 10.1-1402, or the Department of Waste
Management, shall have recourse against any prior owner or the estate of any prior
owner for the costs of clean-up of escheated property in or upon which any hazardous
material as defined in § 44-146.34 is found.
282. Id. § 36-55.33:1(B)(5).
283. Id. § 36-55.33:1(D)(4).
284. Id. § 36-55.34:1.
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records of the jurisdiction in which the housing is located, the
agreement shall "run with the land and be binding on the succes-
sors and assigns of the owner thereof until released of record by
[V]HDA. ' 2 s5 The General Assembly also extended the VHDA's
power to purchase, acquire, construct, and rehabilitate multi-fam-
ily residential housing from June 30, 1992 to July 1, 1997.286
2. Virginia Fair Housing Law
The new Virginia Fair Housing Law2 enacted by the 1991 Gen-
eral Assembly, supersedes sections 36-86 through 36-96 of the
Code.28 The purpose of the act is to promote Virginia's policy "to
provide for fair housing throughout the Commonwealth, to all its
citizens, regardless of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, el-
derliness, familial status, or handicap. . . 2 Purchasers, sellers,
real estate agents, lenders and attorneys engaged in the sale and
leasing of residential real estate should be familiar with the new
Virginia Fair Housing Law.
F. Landlord and Tenant
The General Assembly curtailed some exemptions of the Vir-
ginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act. Now, a natural person
owning more than four single-family residences subject to rental
agreements and located in any city or county having either the ur-
ban county executive form or county manager plan of government
is subject to the act.2 0
Other changes to the act include an additional prohibition on
the inclusion of certain provisions in rental agreements. A landlord
cannot include in a rental agreement for public housing a provision
by which a tenant, as a condition to the tenancy, agrees to a prohi-
bition of the lawful possession of firearms within the rental unit,
unless required by federal law.291 In addition, the General Assem-
285. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-55.34:1(8).
286. Id. § 36-55.33:2(E).
287. Id. §§ 36-96.1 to .23.
288. Id. §§ 36-86 to -96 (Repl. Vol. 1990) (repealed 1991).
289. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-96.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
290. Id. § 55-248.5(A)(10).
291. Id. § 55-248.9(A)(6). This legislation followed on the heels of Richmond Tenants
Org. v. Richmond Redevelopment and Hous. Auth., 753 F. Supp. 607 (E.D. Va. 1990), where
the United States District Court stated that leases which prohibit public housing residents
from possessing firearms are not unreasonable and do not violate the United States Housing
[Vol. 25:859902
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bly revised the definition of "single-family residence" to exclude
multi-family residential structures. 92
G. Leasing of Goods
The 1991 General Assembly enacted Article 2A of the Commer-
cial Code which, effective January 1, 1992, governs leases of
goods.29 3 This enactment is discussed fully in another article in
this survey.2"4
H. Manufactured Housing Licensing and Recovery Fund
The General Assembly added the Manufactured Housing Licens-
ing and Transaction Recovery Fund Law to the Code to address a
number of issues revolving around manufactured homes.295 The act
creates the nine member Virginia Manufactured Housing Board
("Housing Board") within the Department of Housing and Com-
munity Development to oversee licensing, to establish and main-
tain a recovery fund, to process complaints, and to promulgate reg-
ulations authorized under the act with respect to the construction
and sale of manufactured homes. 296
Act.
292. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.4. The modification of this definition is important because
the exemption from the act contained in § 55-248.5(A)(10) only applies to owners of single-
family residences. The definition of "single-family residence" makes it clear that the Gen-
eral Assembly did not intend for the exemption to apply to apartment complexes, regardless
of their size.
293. Id. § 8.2A-101 to -532.
294. See Herbert, Commercial Law: Annual Survey of Virginia Law, 25 U. RICH. L. REV.
681 (1991).
295. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 36-85.16 to .36 (Cum. Supp. 1991). It is important to note that the
act becomes effective on July 1, 1992. Act of Mar. 25, 1991, ch. 555, 1 1991 Va. Acts 957, 970.
A manufactured home is defined as:
a structure constructed to federal standards, transportable in one or more sections,
which, in the traveling mode, is 8 feet or more in width and is 40 feet or more in
length, or when erected on site, is 320 or more square feet, and which is built on a
permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a permanent
foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumbing, heat-
ing, air conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein.
Id. § 36-85.16.
296. Id. § 36-85.17 and .18. The terms "manufacturer," "dealer," "broker," and "salesper-
son," and other significant terms are defined in § 36-85.16 of the act. Id. § 36-85.16. The act
requires that all manufacturers, dealers, brokers, and salespersons obtain an annual license
from the Housing Board. Id. § 36-85.19.
In addition, § 36-85.22 of the act modifies hazard insurance policies which would exclude
coverage under the policy for damage sustained to a manufactured home by windstorm be-
cause the home was incorrectly anchored or tied down. Id. § 36-85.22.
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Pursuant to section 36-85.23 of the Code, each manufacturer,
dealer and supplier of manufactured homes is deemed to have
made certain warranties to manufactured home buyers. Further,
the act includes a procedure by which buyers may submit claims
for breach of a warranty, as well as a provision regarding the obli-
gations and liabilities between manufacturers, dealers, and suppli-
ers.29 8 If a manufacturer, dealer, or supplier denies that it is obli-
gated to make repairs to a manufactured home unit pursuant to its
warranty, it must notify the buyer of that fact and inform the
buyer that he may file a claim with the Housing Board.9 9 Gener-
ally, defects must be remedied within forty-five days after receipt
of written notice of the claim.' 00
The act also prohibits dealers from making alterations to mobile
homes which are unauthorized by the manufacturer..3 0 Addition-
ally, it releases the manufacturer from liability for unauthorized
alterations made by the owner of the unit.30 2
Under the act, each manufacturer, dealer, broker, and salesper-
son in Virginia is required to pay a fee to the Virginia Manufac-
tured Housing Transaction Recovery Fund." Manufactured home
buyers may submit claims to the Housing Board for compensation
from the fund for damages suffered as the result of a regulant's
breach of the act, but only if the regulant fails to pay the claim
within thirty days following receipt of the Housing Board's written
determination that the regulant must pay the claim.304
I. Mobile Home Lot Rental Act
The General Assembly made several amendments to the Mobile
Home Lot Rental Act, including addition of the defined term
297. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-85.23. The warranties are effective for twelve months following
delivery of the manufactured home to the buyer. Id.
298. Id. § 36.85.24. Section 36-85.25 of the act also provides that any manufacturer, dealer
or supplier that, pursuant to a service contract, agrees to remedy certain defects is directly
liable to the buyer as well as the other party to the contract. Id. § 36-85.25.
299. Id. § 36-85.24.
300. Id. § 36-85.25. Defects which constitute safety hazards must be remedied within
three days. Id.
301. Id. § 36-85.26(A).
302. Id. § 36-85.26(B).
303. Id. § 36-85.31(A). Section 36-85.31(B) sets forth a schedule of the fees to be-paid by
each manufacturer, dealer, broker and salesperson.
304. Id. § 36-85.32. The act limits the amount that a claimant is entitled to receive from
the fund for a single violation and the maximum exposure of the fund for claims asserted
against a single regulant during any year. Id. § 36-85.32.
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"abandoned mobile home. 30 5 Further, new section 55-248.42(B) of
the Code provides that all parties having secured interests in the
mobile home must be referenced in the written agreement or rental
application for the mobile home. The agreement must also require
the tenant to notify the landlord of any new security interests in
the mobile home.306
The General Assembly also established the procedure by which a
party holding a security interest in a mobile home may be required
to pay the landlord of the mobile home park rent and "any reason-
able charge in addition to rent" owed by the tenant.3 07 The secured
party's rental obligations to the landlord must be satisfied prior to
the removal of the mobile home from the lot.308 If a secured party
is liable to a landlord for rent and other charges, the rental agree-
ment between the landlord and tenant governs the relationship be-
tween the landlord and the secured party. However, the tenancy
automatically converts to a month-to-month tenancy with either
party having the right to terminate on thirty days written notice.30 9
The General Assembly also provided that if a lot rental agree-
ment is terminated due to rehabilitation or change in the use of
some or all of the mobile home park by the landlord, the landlord
is required to provide the tenant with a 120-day written notice.310
J. Notice of Violations of Lead-Based Paint Standards
The legislature's growing concern with illnesses related to lead
paint is evident in the passage of section 36-107.1 of the Code.
This section provides that the owner of a residential structure re-
ceiving notice from any health department that the structure con-
tains unacceptable levels of lead paint must disclose the violation
305. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.41.
306. Id. § 55-248.42.
307. Id. § 55-248.44:1. The secured party is liable for rent and other reasonable charges in
addition to rent accruing from 15 days after the secured party's receipt of notice of aban-
donment until disposition of the mobile home or its removal from the mobile home park.
The term "reasonable charges in addition to rent" include maintenance and utility costs for
which the tenant under the rental agreement is liable. Id. § 55-248.44:1(F).
308. Id. § 55-248.44:1(G).
309. Id. § 55-248.44:1(H).
310. Id. § 55-248.46. Changes include, among other things, conversion to commercial use,
planned unit development or the sale of the property to a contract purchaser. This notice
requirement may not be waived except by a separate written agreement executed after such
notice is given. Id.
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to a potential purchaser of the structure.3 11 The disclosure must be
in writing and must include a copy of the notice received from the
health department and the requirements concerning the removal
of the lead paint. 12 In addition, the disclosure must be given to
potential purchasers "prior to the signing of a purchase or sales
agreement or, if there is no purchase or sales agreement, prior to
the signing of a deed." '13 An owner who fails to comply with the
disclosure requirement is liable for all damages caused to the pur-
chaser by the owner's non-compliance. In addition, the owner will
be required to pay a civil penalty not to exceed $1,000. 3 14
K. Partnership Property - Continuity of Title
When the name of a limited partnership is changed, or a domes-
tic limited partnership succeeds to the ownership of an interest in
real estate, the clerk of the State Corporation Commission will, on
request, issue a certificate reciting the change of name of the lim-
ited partnership or succession of title in the real estate.15 The cer-
tificate may be recorded in the circuit court of any jurisdiction in
which real estate owned by the partnership is located to track title
to the real estate. Only the clerk's fee must be paid to record the
certificate.3 16
The General Assembly also provided that upon the merger of a
foreign limited partnership owning real estate in Virginia with an-
other foreign limited partnership, the property passes to the sur-
311. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-107.1.
312. Id. The disclosure requirement does not apply to sales agreements or deeds signed
prior to July 1, 1991. However, the disclosure requirement applies where the owner has
accepted a written purchase offer prior to July 1, 1991, if the owner has not executed a
written sales agreement or deed prior to July 1, 1991. Id.
313. Id. If an agreement does exist the seller should insist on a provision by which the
purchaser acknowledges the receipt of the disclosure. In the absence of an agreement, the
owner should obtain a written acknowledgement from the purchaser of the receipt of the
disclosure or at least maintain a copy of the written notice the owner provided to the
purchaser.
Section 36-107.1 of the Code does not require the owner to give the purchaser notice of a
violation that the owner receives after the execution of a sales agreement, or, in the absence
of an agreement, after the execution of a deed.
314. Id. Section 36-107.1 of the Code does not expressly provide that the owner will be
liable for the purchaser's attorney's fees and costs incurred in enforcing the purchaser's
remedies under the section. Each day that an owner fails to remove or cover lead-based
paint to comply with the Uniform Statewide Building Code constitutes a separate offense.
Id. § 36-106.
315. Id. § 50-37.3(A).
316. Id.
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viving limited partnership, except as provided by the laws of the
state governing the surviving limited partnership.31 The issuance
of a certificate tracking title to real estate acquired by a foreign
limited partnership after the merger of two or more foreign limited
partnerships pursuant to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction has also
been addressed. 18
L. Real Estate Brokers
Pursuant to amended section 54.1-2105(2) of the Code,319 the
Virginia Real Estate Board must include in its regulations educa-
tional requirements for the relicensure of brokers and salespersons
to whom the board has issued active licenses. The educational re-
quirements, which must be satisfied prior to each renewal or rein-
statement, apply to applicants seeking relicensure as active brokers
or salespersons 2 0 The General Assembly added a provision to the
section permitting licensees called to serve in the United States
armed forces to complete the educational requirements within six
months after release from active duty.3 21
M. Recordation of Instruments
1. Deeds
The General Assembly added language to section 17-79(B) of the
Code to make it clear that the name of the beneficiary of a deed of
trust need not be listed in the first clause of the deed of trust as a
condition to recordation. 2 '
Section 17-79(C) of the Code has been revised to provide that a
deed made by a person in a representative capacity, devisees or
coparceners must be indexed in the names of the grantors and
grantees. In addition, the name of the former record title owner
must be listed in the first clause of the instrument.3 23
The General Assembly has also required that a clerk or deputy
clerk who is correcting an indexing mistake to note, in the margin
317. VA. CODE ANN. § 50-37.3(B)(1).
318. Id. § 50-37.3(B)(2).
319. Id. § 54.1-2105(2) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
320. Id. Applicants seeking to elevate inactive status licenses to active status licenses
must also satisfy the continuing education requirements. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id. § 17-79(B).
323. Id. § 17-79(C).
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of the index, the nature of the correction as well as the date and
his name or initials. Alternatively, the clerk may make the correc-
tion by any other means capable of maintaining a permanent rec-
ord of the change together with the original recording, provided
that the date and nature of the change is recorded along with the
name of the person making the change. 24
2. Releases
The General Assembly amended section 55-66.3(A)(1) of the
Code by deleting the language authorizing the notation of a certifi-
cate of satisfaction or a certificate of partial satisfaction in the
margin of the page of the book where the encumbrance is recorded.
The certificate of satisfaction or certificate of partial satisfaction
must be recorded in the clerk's office. 25
The General Assembly also amended section 55-66.3(B) of the
Code with respect to lost note affidavits. If the creditor is unable to
produce for recordation an affidavit stating that the debt has been
paid and that the instrument evidencing the debt has been can-
celed and delivered to the debtor or has been lost or destroyed and
cannot be produced, "and files with the clerk an affidavit to that
effect," the lien debtor may file an affidavit with the clerk stating
that the lien has been paid and the instrument evidencing the debt
was cancelled and delivered to him or lost or destroyed.32 6
N. Rescission of Contracts
In an apparent response to cases like Frank v. Tipco Homes, 2 '
the General Assembly repealed section 11-2.3 of the Code.328 In
Tipco, the trial court, construing this section, held that a contract
for the purchase of a lot and the construction of a residence on the
324. VA. CODE ANN. § 17-79.1.
325. Id. § 55-66.3(A)(1). Language in §§ 55-66.3(B) and 55-66.6 relating to marginal nota-
tions of releases has been deleted. The General Assembly also deleted the requirement for a
court order to permit recordation of marginal releases on microfilmed records. The clerk of
the circuit court may make this determination without a court order. Id. § 70-60.1.
326. Id. § 55-66.3(B).
327. 19 Va. Cir. 291 (County of Fairfax Cir. Ct. April 16, 1990); see Bell v. Burleigh, 5 Va.
L. Weekly, Dec. 17, 1990, at 600, col. 2 (City of Norfolk Cir. Ct. Nov. 30, 1990) (V.L.W. 90-
H-489). But cf. Glenwood Constr. Co. v. The Drees Co., 5 Va. L. Weekly, Jan 21, 1991, at 20,
col. 1 (County of Stafford Cir. Ct. Jan. 9, 1991) (VLW 91-H-31) (Section 11-2.3 of the Code
is inapplicable to contract for acquisition of unimproved tract by buyer for development of
residential subdivision).
328. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2.3 (Repl. Vol. 1989) (repealed 1991).
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lot was voidable at the buyer's option because the contract did not
require completed performance within two years after the date of
execution of the contract.329
0. Subdivisions
The provisions which must be included in subdivision ordi-
nances330 have been amended to allow a governing body, or its des-
ignated administrative agency, to make partial releases of bonds or
other performance guarantees that result in bond or guarantee
amounts lower than eighty percent of the original amount of the
guarantee.331 Partial releases in lower amounts would be based
upon the percentage of the facilities completed and approved by
the appropriate jurisdictional body or agency.3 32 Partial releases
are still not permitted before completion of at least thirty percent
of the facilities covered by the guarantee, but the prohibition
against partial releases after completion of over eighty percent of
the facilities has been repealed.33 3
Section 15.1-466 of the Code, which governs single divisions of a
lot for the purpose of sales or gifts to members of the immediate
family, was further amended to expand the definition of immediate
family.33 4 Grandchildren and grandparents of the owner are now
considered immediate family, as well as the owner's children and
spouse.3 5
The conveyance of common or shared easements, permitted by
section 15.1-466 of the Code,3 6 has been amended to include
franchised cable television operators. The shared easements were
previously available only to public service corporations that fur-
nished cable television, gas, telephone and electric service to a pro-
329. Form contracts for the sale of lots and the construction of residences in develop-
ments subject to the Federal Interstate Full Disclosure Land Sales Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-
1720 (1982), should still be drafted to comply with the regulations promulgated by the Fed-
eral Department of Housing and Urban Development in connection with the act. The De-
partment considers contracts which do not require complete performance within two years
after the purchaser's execution of the contract unqualified for the improved lot exemption
to the registration requirements of the act. 24 C.F.R. pt. 1710, app. A, part IV(b) (1991).
330. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
331. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(4).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(2).
335. Id.
336. Id. § 15.1-466(A)(6).
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posed subdivision.3 7 To share the easement, however, franchised
cable television operators must agree to the terms and conditions
of the common or shared easement as set out in the declaration
referred to on the final subdivision plat.33 s Failure to do so will not
defeat or impair the common easement conveyed. 39
P. Taxation
1. Special Assessments for Local Improvements
Governing bodies of counties, cities and towns are now author-
ized to include in taxes or assessments imposed on property owners
whose lands abut improved land, "the legal, financial or other di-
rectly attributable costs incurred by the locality in creating the
district and financing the payment of the improvements. '" 340 How-
ever, the General Assembly retained the limitation that the taxes
not exceed the "peculiar benefits resulting from the improvements
to such abutting property owners. ' '341
Additionally, a new section has been added to the Code to au-
thorize localities to operate stormwater utilities and stormwater
control programs. 42 The localities may assess service charges to all
property owners based upon the amount of stormwater runoff that
each property contributes. 43 Unpaid charges constitute a lien
against the property.3 44 The localities may finance the infrastruc-
ture and equipment for a stormwater control program with the is-
suance of general obligation bonds or revenue bonds, 45 and may
enter cooperative agreements with other localities. 46
Section 15.1-321 of the Code,3 47 as amended, permits counties,
cities and towns to assess fees, rents or charges on resident users of
a municipality's water or sewer system for the purpose of control-
337. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-466(A)(6).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-239 (Cum. Supp. 1991). Such improvements include, among
other things, enlargements to walkways on existing streets, improving and paving existing
alleys, and constructing sanitary and stormwater sewers. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. § 15.1-292.4.
343. Id. § 15.1-292.4(B).
344. Id. § 15.1-292.4(D). Liens for unpaid charges have the same priority as liens for un-
paid taxes. Id.
345. Id. § 15.1-292.4(C).
346. Id. § 15.1-292.4(E).
347. Id. § 15.1-321.
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ling the discharges from combined sanitary and stormwater sewer
systems.48
2. Land Use Assessments
The General Assembly amended section 58.1-3233(1) of the
Code to provide that the governing body of a county operating
under the urban county form of government may, by ordinance,
permit real property located there to qualify for lower land use as-
sessments by reducing the minimum acreage for open-space use
from five acres to two acres.349
The General Assembly also provided that a county and town
may agree to send to each taxpayer, at least fourteen days prior to
the date when due, single tax bills for real property taxes and per-
sonal property taxes.3 50 In addition, the section which provides
that penalties and interest will not be imposed where, through no
fault of the taxpayer the tax is not paid, was clarified by explaining
what constitutes a lack of fault on the part of the taxpayer.3 51
Finally, the General Assembly provided that in a bill in equity
for the sale of property to recover delinquent real estate taxes, the
bill may cover two or more parcels owned by different parties but
with separate assessed values that do not exceed $100,000.352
Q. Virginia Property Owners' Association Act
In 1991, the General Assembly made significant changes to the
Virginia Property Owners' Association Act 353 ("POAA"). The
348. VA. CoDE ANN. § 15.1-321.
349. Id. § 58.1-3233(2). At this point in time, Fairfax County is the only county operating
under the urban county form of government.
350. Id. § 58.1-3912(D).
351. Id. § 58.1-3916. The General Assembly added the following provision to § 58.1-3916
of the Code:
The failure to file a return or to pay a tax due to a medically determinable physical or
mental impairment on the date the return or tax is due shall be presumptive proof of
lack of fault on the taxpayer's part, provided the return is filed or the taxes are paid
within thirty days of the due date; however, this provision shall not apply if there is a
committee, legal guardian or other fiduciary handling the individual's affairs.
Id.
352. Id. § 58.1-3968. The section previously only permitted the bill to cover two or more
parcels if the assessed value of each parcel did not exceed $20,000. VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-
3968 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
353. Id. §§ 55-508 to -516 (Cum. Supp. 1991). The General Assembly added "Virginia" to
the official name of the POAA. Id. § 55-509.
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POAA now exempts from its provisions developments which im-
pose on the homeowners' association maintenance or operational
responsibilities in an amount less than $150 per year per lot, or on
the owners or occupants of lots in the development a mandatory
regular annual assessment of less than $150 per year per lot. Also
exempt are associations which do not have authority under the
declaration to impose regular annual assessments in excess of $150
per year.354
The General Assembly clarified the applicability of the POAA.
For instance, language inserted in section 55-508 of the Code states
that the POAA is intended to supplement, not affect the validity
of, the provisions of declarations recorded prior to July 1, 1989.111
The section also provides that if any lot in a development is sub-
ject to the POAA, the entire development is subject to the
POAA.3 56
Several definitions used in the POAA were also modified. For
instance, common area must be designated as such in the declara-
tion to fall within the POAA definition of "common area. '357 The
definition of "development" now includes the additional elements
that any person owning a lot in the development must be a mem-
ber of an association and must be obligated to pay assessments
provided for in a declaration.3 58 The definition of "association"
now refers to the incorporated or unincorporated entity upon
which responsibilities are imposed and authority granted by the
declaration. 59
The General Assembly amended the association's record keeping
and disclosure requirements. The records that the association is re-
354. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-509. A development would not qualify for the exemption if the
association merely imposed an annual assessment of $150 per year per lot or less. If the
association is authorized to impose a greater annual assessment, even though the annual
assessment does not actually exceed $150 per lot per year, the exemption does not apply. It
is not clear whether the term "authorized" refers to an express grant of authority in the
declaration or the absence of a restriction on the association's right to impose an annual
assessment in excess of $150 per year per lot. The declaration should include an express cap
on the annual assessment if it is intended that a development fall within this exemption. It
should also be noted that this exemption is not available "to any development subject to a
declaration recorded prior to July 1, 1991." Id. § 55-508.
355. Id. § 55-508(A).
356. Id. Therefore, the POAA applies to retail and business parcels treated within mixed
use developments.
357. Id. § 55-509.
358. Id.
359. Id.
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quired to maintain are now confined to "receipts and expenditures
affecting the operation and administration of the association."360
Perhaps the most significant changes in the POAA are those ad-
dressing the issues of sales contract disclosures and cancellation
rights. The General Assembly amended the disclosure statement
which a seller is required to insert into the sales contract for a lot
in a development subject to the POAA.3 61 More importantly, the
General Assembly armed purchasers with the right to cancel the
sales contract after receiving, or after failing to receive, the disclo-
sure packet referred to in the contract.6 2 These cancellation rights
are set forth in section 55-511(C) of the Code.363
Unlike the previous disclosure requirements, providing the pur-
chaser with the disclosure packet or a notice that the packet is
unavailable is now mandatory. Additionally, a request from the
purchaser to the seller for the disclosure packet is no longer
required.364
360. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-510(A). The General Assembly also clarified an ambiguity in §
55-510 of the Code by deleting the phrase "to protect his interest," an apparent limitation
on a member's right of access to association records. Id. § 55-510(B).
361. Id. § 55-511. The disclosure statement is required to provide that:
(i) the lot is located within a development which is subject to the Virginia Property
Owners' Association Act, (ii) the Act requires the seller to obtain from the property
owners' association an association disclosure packet and provide it to the purchaser,
(iii) the purchaser may cancel the contract within three days after receiving the asso-
ciation disclosure packet or being notified that the association disclosure packet will
not be available, and (iv) the right to receive the association disclosure packet and
the right to cancel the contract are waived conclusively if not exercised before
settlement.
Id. § 55-511(A). New language in § 55-512(A) of the Code establishes that the association is
deemed to receive a request for a disclosure packet six days after the postmark date if sent
by United States mail and on the date of delivery if delivered by hand. Id.
362. Id. § 55-511(C). The General Assembly clarified an ambiguity in § 55-511(B) of the
Code by providing that a purchaser may cancel a sales contract only prior to settlement if
the sales contract omits the disclosure statement. The General Assembly also substituted
"cancel" for "avoidance" with reference to the purchaser's remedies. See id. § 55-511(B).
363. Id. Section 55-511(C) of the Code provides that the purchaser may cancel the con-
tract within three days after the date of the contract if, prior to or upon signing the con-
tract, the purchaser received the disclosure packet or notice that the packet would not be
available. If the disclosure packet or notice of unavailability is not provided to the purchaser
prior to or upon the date of the contract, the purchaser may cancel the contract within three
days after hand delivery of the packet or notice that the packet is unavailable or, if the
packet is sent to the purchaser by United States mail, within six days after the postmark
date. The purchaser also has the right to cancel the contract at any time prior to settlement
if the purchaser does not receive the disclosure packet or notice that the packet is unavaila-
ble. Id. However, the purchaser's rights to cancel the contract are waived if not exercised
prior to settlement. Id. § 55-511(E).
364. See id. § 55-511(A)(ii). The General Assembly also deleted some confusing language
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These new disclosure and cancellation provisions should moti-
vate sellers to provide contract purchasers with the disclosure
packet early in the contract period. This is the only way to dispose
of the purchaser's cancellation rights, unless the purchaser waives
those rights in a separate writing pursuant to new section 55-
511(F) of the Code.36 5 Sellers should also consider obtaining a writ-
ten receipt from each contract purchaser when the disclosure
packet is delivered to the purchaser, whether before or after the
purchaser's execution of the contract.
The requirements for the contents of the disclosure packet have
been renumbered, but not substantively changed. Section 55-
511(C) of the Code now requires that the information disclosed by
the association be current "to a specified date within thirty days of
the date of the contract."3 6 Additionally, when more than six
months have passed between the contract date and settlement, a
contract purchaser may obtain directly from an association, for a
fee not to exceed $50, assurances that a disclosure packet previ-
ously delivered to the purchaser is still accurate or a statement
specifying material changes to the information. 67 The POAA, how-
ever, does not provide the purchaser with a right of cancellation if
material changes have occurred. Therefore, the purchaser may
want to reserve this right in the contract.
Section 55-512(E) of the Code was amended to clarify that
neither the inclusion of the disclosure statement in the contract
nor the delivery of the disclosure packet is required for particular
transactions .36 Added to the list of excluded transactions is "[a]
from § 55-512(A) of the Code which appeared to have required the purchaser to provide the
seller with a second written request for the disclosure packet after the seller received the
packet from the association. See id. § 55-519(A)(10).
365. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-511(F).
366. Id. § 55-511(C). This provision, which requires that the disclosure packet be accurate
as of a specified date not more than 30 days prior to the date of the contract, is probably for
the purpose of protecting the purchaser from stale information. Unfortunately, the Act does
not expressly provide whether or not the delivery of a stale disclosure packet to the pur-
chaser constitutes a complete failure to deliver. Arguably, a disclosure packet containing
accurate information but current only as of a date 31 days before the date of the contract is
null and void, thereby allowing the purchaser to cancel the contract at any time prior to
settlement.
367. Id. § 55-511(D). In order to obtain the assurances, the purchaser is required to sub-
mit a copy of the purchase contract to the association with a request for the assurances or a
statement of any material changes. The association must provide the assurances within 10
days after receipt of the contract and request. Id.
368. Id. § 55-512(E). This amendment corrected an inconsistency in § 55-511 of the Code,
which required the inclusion of the disclosure statement in all contracts, notwithstanding
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disposition of a lot to a person in the business of selling real estate
who offers lots for his own account."3 69 For example, lot sales con-
tracts between developers and builders will no longer require the
disclosure statement nor necessitate the delivery of the disclosure
packet to the builder.
The General Assembly modified the procedures by which the as-
sociation may promulgate regulations and impose punitive assess-
ments and special assessments. A majority of votes cast at a meet-
ing of the association convened in accordance with the
association's bylaws will effect the amendment or repeal of regula-
tions adopted by the board of directors of the association.37 0 Also,
the board of directors of a homeowners' association may, if the
declaration or rules and regulations of the association expressly
provide, assess charges against members for violations of the decla-
ration or rules and regulations.37 1 Added to the Code is a provision
requiring the association to indemnify its officers and directors if a
special assessment providing funds necessary to carrying out the
officer's or director's duties is rescinded by the members. 7 2
Several amendments affect the mechanism for filing a memoran-
dum of lien for assessment against a member's lot. The association
now has twelve months instead of six months from the date the
assessment became due to file a memorandum of lien for the as-
the exemption of certain transactions from the requirement for the delivery of the disclo-
sure packet as set forth in § 55-512(E) of the Code. See id. §§ 55-511, 512(E) (Cum. Supp.
1990).
369. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-512(E)(5) (Cure. Supp. 1991).
370. Id. § 55-513(A). This section previously required a vote by the majority of the mem-
bers of the association to amend or repeal a rule or regulation. However, that language ig-
nored the reality of current association voting structures. Voting rights in many associations
provide for various classes of voting rights. The one-person-one-vote voting structure is rare,
especially in associations affiliated with large developments built over an extended period of
time. The amended section accommodates more sophisticated voting structures.
The substitution of "bylaws" for "declaration," is consistent with actual practice in that
an association's bylaws customarily outline the quorum and other voting requirements for
matters presented to the members for action.
371. Id. § 55-513. This section previously provided that the board of directors could seek
an injunction against a member for a violation of the declaration or the association's rules
and regulations. Id. § 55-513(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
Notice and a hearing are required prior to the imposition of the charges. The charges,
which will be treated as assessments for the purpose of § 55-516 of the Code, must not
exceed $50 for a single offense or $10 per day for a continuing offense. Id. § 55-513(B) (Cum.
Supp. 1991).
372. Id. § 55-514(A) of the Code. Section 55-514(A) grants to the members the right to
rescind a special assessment adopted by the board of directors.
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sessment.3 7 The memorandum must include a statement that the
association is obtaining a lien pursuant to the POAA.374 Finally,
the judgment or decree enforcing the lien must include "reim-
bursement for costs and reasonable attorney's fees, together with
interest at the maximum lawful rate for the sums secured by the
lien from the time each such sum became due and payable. '37 5
R. Virginia Real Estate Time-Share Act
The 1991 General Assembly made a number of amendments to
the Virginia Real Estate Time-Share Act. Many of the changes af-
fect the dissemination of information about the association and its
affairs to the members. Section 55-369 of the Code, concerning de-
veloper responsibilities, has been added to the list of sections that
apply to time-share projects created prior to July 1, 1985.237 The
General Assembly has also now defined "board of directors" as the
governing body in a time-share estate owner's association.7
The time-share instrument, which is required to outline arrange-
ments for the management of the project, must now include a pro-
vision permitting the association to terminate maintenance and
service contracts entered into by the developer after the expiration
of the developer control period.3 7s The time-share instrument must
also provide for the dissemination of information to time-share
owners regarding debts incurred in the operation of the project
and the manner in which the debts will be satisfied.7 9
The definition of "time-share estate occupancy expenses" was
amended to include expenses incurred in the time-share estate
owners' "use and occupancy of the time-share estate project in-
373. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-516(B).
374. Id. § 516(B)(7). The addition of the word "Virginia" was the only change to this
requirement.
375. Id. § 55-516(F).
376. Id. § 55-361.1. Section 55-369(A) of the Code outlines the developer's obligation to
bear the cost of operating and managing the project during the developer's control period.
Section 55-369(B) of the Code requires the developer to convey the project, except for units,
to the time-share estate owners' association upon the happening of certain events.
377. Id. § 55-362.
378. Id. § 55-368(4). The General Assembly deleted language from § 55-369(B) which pro-
vided the association with termination rights upon the expiration of ten years after the first
sale of a time-share unit by the developer. Id. § 55-369(B)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
379. Id. § 55-368(5) (Cum. Supp. 1991). The General Assembly deleted a provision con-
tained in § 55-369(B) of the Code requiring the developer to prepare a summary of the
debts incurred in managing and operating the time-share project and the manner in which
the debts would be satisfied. Id. § 369(B) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
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cluding its completed and occupied time-share estate units and
amenities available for use. ' 380 This broader definition permits the
developer to pass on a greater portion of the costs of maintaining
and operating the project to time-share estate owners.
Section 55-369(B) of the Code now provides that the developer
control period may terminate in phases as portions of the project
are conveyed to the association.8
The General Assembly squarely placed with the board of direc-
tors of the project's association the authority to impose special as-
sessments and raise the annual assessments charged to time-share
estate owners.382 However, the assessments or increases must be in
the best interests of the association and must be used "primarily
for the maintenance and upkeep, including capital expenditures, of
the project. 3 3
The General Assembly clarified that the association's lien for un-
paid assessments affects the defaulting owner's time-share estate,
not the time-share unit.38 4 In addition, the memorandum of lien
which the association must record to perfect its lien on a time-
share estate is now required to include the description of the unit
in which the time-share is located. 85
Section 55-370(C) of the Code was revised to provide that, not-
withstanding the provisions of the Virginia Nonstock Corporation
Act, 88 the bylaws of the association may prescribe different quo-
rum requirements for meetings of members.3 87 Also, the association
is now required, subject to a broad exception, to make the books
and records of the association available to its members.
3 88
The General Assembly has permitted the developer to provide in
the time-share instrument, in bold type, that the developer will not
380. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-369(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991). The old definition of "time-share
estate occupancy expenses" was more narrowly drawn to include only expenses incurred in
operating and maintaining the interior time-share units. See id. § 55-369(A) (Repl. Vol.
1986).
381. Id. § 55-369(B) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
382. Id. § 55-370(A).
383. Id.
384. Id. § 55-370(B).
385. Id. § 55-370(B)(2).
386. See id. §§ 13.1-801 to -944 (Repl. Vol. 1989 and Supp. 1990).
387. Id. § 55-370(C)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1991). Former § 55-370(C) of the Code has been
renumbered as § 55-370(C)(1).
388. Id. § 55-370(C)(3). The association's books and records may be made unavailable for
"use in matters not concerning the members of the time-share association." Id.
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be responsible for assessments charged by the association after the
expiration of the developer control period.3 89 Absent such a provi-
sion, the developer is responsible for paying those assessments on
the same footing as other time-share estate owners.9 0
The developer, during its control period, and thereafter the asso-
ciation, are required to produce an annual report of pertinent in-
formation regarding the association and its finances. However, this
report need not be prepared for the first year of the time-share
program.3 91 The report must now include "[a] statement of the
time-share occupancy expenses, dues, special assessments or other
charges due for the current year from each time-share estate
owner."
392
Two final changes to the act worthy of note are the addition of
section 55-374.1(C) of the Code, which provides that in the event
of a conflict, the provisions of the Prizes and Gifts Act 3 3 control
over section 55-374.1 of the Code,394 and the addition of an excep-
tion to the requirement that a developer provide an amended of-
fering statement to a purchaser if the statement is amended after
the contract is signed but before settlement.39 5
S. Wet Settlement Act
Under the Virginia Wet Settlement Act, lenders are now permit-
ted to deliver loan funds to settlement agents in the form of teller's
checks with equivalent funds available in conformity with the fed-
eral Expedited Funds Availability Act. 9 '
389. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-350(E).
390. Id. § 55-370(E). The General Assembly deleted a portion of § 55-369(A) of the Code
which allocated time-share operating expenses and time-share occupancy expenses between
the association and the developer after the expiration of the developer control period. See
id. § 369(A) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
391. Id. § 55-370.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
392. Id. § 55-370.1(B)(5).
393. Id. §§ 59.1-415 to -423 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
394. Id. § 55-374.1(C) (Cure. Supp. 1991). Section 55-374.1 of the Code regulates time-
share project developers' advertising practices.
395. Id. § 55-376(C). The developer is not required to provide the contract purchaser with
an amended statement where the amendment is the result of "the orderly development of
the time-share project in accordance with the project instrument." Id.
396. Id. § 6.1-2.10(5) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001 to 4010 (1987)).
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T. Zoning and Land Use
1. Adoption of Zoning Ordinances
An amendment to section 15.1-493 of the Code requires that the
public notice for proposed amendments to a zoning map state the
general usage and density range, if any, set forth in the pertinent
part of the comprehensive plan. This requirement is in addition to
stating the general usage and density range of the proposed zoning
amendment.3 9 7
2. Affordable Housing
The list of local governments eligible to adopt amendments to
their zoning ordinances to provide for an affordable housing dwell-
ing unit program has been expanded with the General Assembly's
amendments of sections 15.1-491.8 s11 and 15.1-491.9 of the Code.3 e9
The list of authorized governing bodies includes: (a) counties with
the urban county executive form of government;400 (b) counties or
cities adjacent to or surrounded by counties with the urban county
executive form of government; 401 (c) cities completely surrounded
by counties with the county executive form of government; 02 (d)
cities with populations of 31,000 to 66,000;4o3 (e) cities with popula-
tions of 140,000 to 160,000;404 (f) counties with populations of
40,000 to 45,000;405 and (g) counties with populations of 64,000 to
73,000.406 Other localities that had ordinances which provided op-
tional increases in density for low and moderate income housing
that were adopted prior to December 31, 1988, were
grandfathered. °7
Subsection B of section 15.1-491.9 of the Code lists the regula-
397. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-493(C) (Cum. Supp. 1991).
398. Id. § 15.1-491.8.
399. Id. § 15.1-491.9.
400. Id. § 15.1-491.8. Fairfax County is the only county with the urban county executive
form of government.
401. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A)(i). These governing bodies include Loudoun County, Prince Wil-
liam County, Arlington County and the Cities of Fairfax, Alexandria and Falls Church.
402. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A)(ii). These cities are Manassas, Manassas Park and Charlottesville.
403. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A)(iii). Petersburg, Suffolk and Danville have populations of this
size.
404. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A)(iv). Only the City of Chesapeake falls within this classification.
405. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A)(v). York County's population meets this requirement.
406. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A)(vi). Albemarle County's population is within this range.
407. Id. § 15.1-491.9(A).
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tions and provisions which may be included in a zoning ordinance
which establishes an affordable housing dwelling unit program.40 8
The requirements for an affordable housing program may be ap-
plied to any site which is the subject of a rezoning application or
special exception and, with this amendment, may also be applied
to site plans or subdivision plats, at the discretion of the local gov-
erning body.40 9 The developable density of each site subject to the
ordinance may be increased up to twenty percent.410 Up to twelve
and one-half percent of the total units approved, including the op-
tional density increase, may be required by the ordinance to be
affordable dwelling units.41' The twenty percent to twelve and one-
half percent ratio must be maintained in the event a twenty per-
cent increase is not achieved.412 Alternatively, ordinances may pro-
vide for density increases of up to ten percent of the density,4 13
and may require six and one-quarter percent of the total number
of approved dwelling units to be affordable dwelling units.41 4
Under this scenario, a ratio of ten percent to six and one-quarter
percent must be maintained in the event a ten percent increase is
not achieved.415 The amended statute also provides for regulations
which require the construction of affordable dwelling units offered
for sale or rental to be in proportion to those units being offered at
market rates.41 6
3. Board of Zoning Appeals
The amendment of section 15.1-495417 of the Code expands the
powers of the boards of zoning appeals. Boards of zoning appeals
now have the authority to limit the duration of permits which have
been granted,418 and may, after proper notice and hearing, revoke
special exceptions whose conditions have been violated.419
408. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491.9(B).
409. Id. § 15.1-491.9(B)(2).
410. Id. § 15.1-491.9(B)(3).
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Id. § 15.1-491.9(B)(6).
414. Id. § 15.1-491.9(B)(7).
415. Id.
416. Id. § 15.1-491.9(B)(14).
417. Id. § 15.1-495.
418. Id. § 15.1-495(6).
419. Id. § 15.1-495(7).
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4. Comprehensive Plan
Section 15.1-447 of the Code was amended to include environ-
mental factors as one of the matters to be considered relating to
the purposes of the comprehensive plan.420 Also, a current map of
the area covered by the comprehensive plan is now required.421
5. Conditional Zoning
The General Assembly amended and re-enacted section 15.1-
491.2:1 of the Code to include towns that experience a population
growth of ten percent or more among the municipalities whose
zoning ordinances may provide for voluntary written proffers from
owners as part of their requests for rezoning or amendments to a
zoning map.422 Previously, section 15.1-491.2:1(A) of the Code ap-
plied to any county or city.423
6. Demolition of Historic Structures
Today, counties that have adopted the urban county executive
form of government may impose a civil penalty against persons
who, without prior approval, demolish or move buildings that are
designated as historic or are located in historic districts.424 This
remedy is being provided, in addition to the zoning administrator's
authority to bring legal action425 and actions by a governing
body,426 when zoning ordinances are violated.
The civil penalty is enforceable by the county attorney in the
circuit court.427 The violator's liability must be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 428 The fine imposed is limited to the
market value of the historic structure together with the market
value of the real property at the time of the demolition or removal
of the historic structure.429
420. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-447(A)(1).
421. Id. § 15.1-447(B).
422. Id. § 15.1-491.2:1(A)(i).
423. Id. § 15.1-491.2:1(A)(T) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
424. Id. § 15.1-499.2 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
425. Id. § 15.1-491(d) (Cum. Supp. 1990).
426. Id. § 15.1-499 (Cum. Supp. 1991).
427. Id. § 15.1-499.2.
428. Id.
429. Id.
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7. Expedited Land Development Review Procedure
A separate review procedure for expedited approval of subdivi-
sion and site plans and other development plans is now available
to certain counties. 430 Counties having a population between 80,000
and 90,000 (for example, Loudoun County) and between 212,000
and 216,000 (for example, Prince William County) are eligible to
establish an expedited land development review procedure where
qualified individuals, called plans examiners, review and recom-
mend which submitted plans may qualify for the separate process-
ing procedure."'
The new statute sets forth the qualification criteria for the per-
sons who may participate in the program.432 The adoption of an
expedited review procedure requires the establishment of a plans
examiner board to serve in an advisory capacity to the board of
supervisors regarding the general operation of the program.433
8. Manufactured Housing
The uniform regulations for manufactured housing as set forth
in section 15.1-486.4 of the Code were also amended.434 Manufac-
tured housing units shall be permitted in all agricultural zoning
districts, or in districts similarly classified, such as horticultural or
forest uses, subject to development standards equal to those for
conventional, site-built single family dwellings.3 5
430. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-501.1.
431. Id. § 15.1-501.1(A).
432. Id. § 15.1-501.1(B). The minimum requirements are:
1. A bachelor of science degree in engineering, architecture, landscape architecture or
related science or equivalent experience or a land surveyor....
2. Successful completion of an education program specified by the board.
3. A minimum of two years of land development engineering design experience ac-
ceptable to the board.
4. Attendance at continuing educational courses specified by the board.
5. Consistent preparation and submission of plans which meet all applicable ordi-
nances and regulations.
Id. References to the 'board' are to the board of supervisors. Id.
433. Id. § 15.1-501(C). The plans examiner board shall be composed of six members ap-
pointed by the board of supervisors for staggered four year terms. Id. Three of the plans
examiner board members must be licensed engineers or land surveyors in private practice.
Other members are to include one citizen member, one person employed by the county gov-
ernment and one non-voting member from the Virginia Department of Transportation. Id.
434. Id. § 15.1-486.4(A).
435. Id.
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9. Penalties for Violation of Ordinances
The penalties which may be established by governing bodies for
violating county ordinances, or the ordinances of municipal corpo-
rations, have been increased by amendments to sections 15.1-505436
and 15.1-901 of the Code.43 7 Maximum allowable fines were in-
creased from $1,000.00 to $2,500.00 or jail confinement of up to
twelve months. The $2,500.00 maximum fine may be exceeded if a
greater amount is dictated by the charter of any city or town.438
IV. CONCLUSION
During the past year, courts in Virginia, including the Supreme
Court of Virginia, have addressed a number of issues relating to
property law. The issues ranged from the standard of knowledge
by which a land owner will be measured to determine if the owner
had sufficient knowledge of an adverse use of his property to the
requirements for creating vested rights in zoning classifications
beneficial to a property owner.
The 1991 General Assembly continued attempts to clarify and
improve the Virginia Condominium Act and the Virginia Property
Owners' Association Act. In addition, the General Assembly broad-
ened the application of the Virginia Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act and made significant amendments to the Mobile Home
Lot Rental Act which will inure to the benefit of tenants. And,
consistent with recent years, the General Assembly remained ac-
tive in the field of zoning.
436. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-505.
437. Id. § 15.1-901.
438. Id.
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